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**Does European Regionalism lead to
Separatism?**

*An analysis and forecast of regionalism in Europe under consideration of
the Kingdom of Denmark and its autonomous regions*

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**Europa-Kolleg Hamburg
Institute for European Integration**

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Does European Regionalism lead to Separatism?

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Roland Brandtjen*

Abstract

Considering the ongoing critique of the democratic deficit, the principle of subsidiarity, its high position inside the European Union and the newly introduced Treaty of Lisbon with its innovations, it becomes more and more important to observe in how far the interests and opinions of the regions are included in the EU policy-making process. Regionalism in Europe and its effects are examined in the paper on hand.

Therefore, the political notions of separatism, nationalism, regionalism and Europeanism are defined. It becomes clear that the people's regional, national or European feeling of identity is essential for arising separatism. Examining the legal, economic and cultural aspects shows that Europe, by its measures, increases regional integration. The first aspect includes examinations on EU principles and the Committee of the Regions as well as non-EU legislation on a more general level. In contrast, the economic aspect focuses on a very specific matter: the European Regional Policy.

In the scope of this paper, the Kingdom of Denmark is used as a case study by observing its three nations – Denmark, including its different regions, Greenland and the Faroe Islands. A conclusion and a forecast will be given in the final remarks.

Sources of information, such as literature or Websites, as well as the Declaration of Authenticity can be found in the Annex.

key words: separatism, Europeanism/European identity, Denmark, Greenland, Faroese Islands

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List of Abbreviations

AER	Assembly of European Regions
BENELUX	Belgium, Netherlands and Luxemburg
CLRA	Congress of Local and Regional Authorities
CM	Council of Ministers
COE	Council of Europe
COM	European Commission
COR	Committee of the Regions
DKK	Danish Crown; national currency of Denmark
EC	European Community
ECHR	European Convention on Human Right
ECO	European Council
ECT	Consolidated Version of the Treaty establishing the European Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EESC	European Economic and Social Committee
EMU	European Monetary Union
EP	European Parliament
ERP	European Regional Policy
ERDF	European Regional Development Fund
ESF	European Social Fund
EU	European Union
EUSF	European Union Solidarity Fund
GDP	Growth Domestic Product
GDP p.c.	Growth Domestic Product per capita
GNP	Growth National Product
KOD	Kingdom of Denmark
MEP	Member of European Parliament
NRP	National Regional Policy
NSRF	National Strategic Reference Framework
NUTS	Nomenclature of Statistical Territorial Units
TEN-T	Trans-European Transport Network
TEU	Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union (Lisbon treaty)
TFEU	Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Lisbon treaty)
UN-Charter	Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice
WTO	World Trade Organization

1. Introduction

Considering the ongoing critique of the democratic deficit, the multi-level-governance approach and the newly introduced Treaty of Lisbon with its innovations, it becomes more and more important to observe in how far the interests and opinions of the regions are included in the EU policy-making process. Regional and local authorities are the main actors of the political system with which the citizens are in direct contact. The people often know their local or regional representative personally and influence him. Taking a high degree of representation for granted, how integrated is a region inside the EU system and in how far this strength leads to separatism? Are there specific factors for the EU system which create separatist movements from the sub-national level? The Kingdom of Denmark will be subject of a case study. It is predestined to compare different regions since it has differently structured ones: urban authorities and rural areas, autonomous regions and central state.

1.1 Subject of Examination

The hypothesis which is subject to examination in the scope of this master thesis is titled: European regionalism leads to separatism. Meant is that the EU or other European actors strengthen European regions by their cultural, economic or legal measures, principles and policies insofar, that separatism or separatist movements arise or strengthen to such an extent, that regions prepare or start thinking about their declaration of independence from the national state.

In contrast, European regionalism might not strengthen regions so that separatism appears but that it decreases or even becomes abolished. The counter-thesis would therefore be: European regionalism does not lead to separatism.

In general, it will be examined how European actors strengthen regions and their position. As a result, the effects of the measures, principles and provisions will be considered. The main aspect of the master thesis will be of political nature. Its aim is to analyse the current situation under consideration of economic, legal and political aspects. Based on this analysis and the Kingdom of Denmark used as a case study, this master thesis will give some predictions about the future development of regionalism and its different regions.

1.2 Procedural method

For a better understanding it is useful to explain some general characteristics of regionalism first. Hence, it is essential to give not just some explanations on separatism and regionalism, but also on the definition of the terms “region” inside a state, “nation” and “Europeanism” (including their related identities).

As the regions are not only depending on national – or even regional – legislation but also on the European Legal Order and International Law, it is necessary to consider the legal basis, such as the EU principle and provisions, the division of competences in Europe, some European legal acts and the Danish constitution and the Home Rule acts.

Because the “raison d’être” of the EU is of economic nature and economic data is always used for the decision-making process, it is necessary to analyse some economic figures regarding the European regional policy and its effects on Denmark.

Denmark itself and some of its regions will be presented and examined on factors which might lead to separatism, not considering the autonomous Danish regions. Greenland and the Faroe Islands and their relation to Denmark and the EU will be discussed in a later chapter.

The last part of this master thesis will sum up the results and conclusions of its examination. It as well includes an evaluation on the procedural method used in the current paper.

2. Definitions and explanatory notes

It is necessary to explain several notions to comprehend the problematic of this thesis. Starting with separatism, basic, topic-related terms will be defined in the following.

2.1 Separatism and Nationalism

In his preface, David A. King describes under an economic consideration that separatism tries to achieve independent economic actions and puts the focus on the economic losses and gains of a new country.¹ More general speaking, separatist parties persist in their efforts to create states.² With the focus on the “effort” to create states, it implies: As soon as a sovereign state has been established, the “separatist parties” are no longer considered as such. In the literature this kind of parties is often considered as nationalist³, considering their *nation* as more important as any other. In other words separatism is a kind of nationalism.⁴

Nationalism has made “the objective of obtaining and using state power”⁵ to its central task. “Obtaining” is the important word, which strongly links nationalism to separatism. The question is: what makes parties feel the need of creating a state?

Anthony D. Smith argues that nationalism, independent of any historical occurrences, has following crucial characteristics:⁶

- By the nature of mankind, it divides itself into different people with their own *national character*.
- Only its deployment results in a thriving of the community of peoples.
- To establish such a community, the people have to be able to identify themselves with their nation / people. Such a feeling of identity creates a high loyalty towards its nation.
- Only by creating a sovereign state with its own government a nation is able to flourish. For this reason a nation has its inalienable right of self-determination which is acknowledged in international law.⁷
- All legitimacy rises from the willingness of the nation. States have to act according to its wishes otherwise they will lose their legitimacy.

Insofar, nationalism is strongly related to a nation and to people. Smith focused on the term “nation as a state”, but in the literature it can be found that nationalism is nevertheless related to ethnic groups or regions.⁸ To clear up the terms of “nationalism” and “separatism” the notion of a nation and an ethnic group will now be considered. Regions will be beheld in another chapter.

2.1.1 Nation

A nation can be understood in different ways. The general definition describes it as a collective unit of human beings which have a common sense of belonging and differentiation due to ethnical, linguistic, cultural and/or political reasons. Since the 19th century the analytical division into “Kulturnation” and “Willensnation” are most common.⁹ The first describes a cultural nation considering humans, among others, share the same cultural characteristics: language,

¹ King 1973, p. V.

² Laible 2008, p. 6.

³ Laible 2008, p. 75 / Rosecrance, in: Rosecrance & Stein (eds.) No More States? – Globalization, National Self-determination, and Terrorism 2006, p. 280.

⁴ Smith, in: Williams (ed.) National Separatism 1982, p. 17.

⁵ Breuilly 1993, p. 1.

⁶ Smith 1983, pp. 21-22.

⁷ Art.1 II UN-Charter.

⁸ Gellner 1983, p. 12-13.

⁹ Riescher, in Nohlen / Grotz (eds.), Kleines Lexikon der Politik, p. 344.

history, parentage, traditions and customs.¹⁰ Examples for that definition can be found easily: Japan, Italy, Portugal, Finland, etc. These countries are considered as nation-states. A nation-state exists if the state territory coincides with the territory of a cultural state.¹¹ Examples like Switzerland, the USA or South Africa do not belong in that category. However, they are considered as nations. Such nations are defined as “Willensnation” – nation of consensus / will – which is more a nation through an agreement or the pure will to be a nation. Especially Switzerland would be the best example for a so called “nation of consensus / will”; with four different languages, and, up to a certain point, a different history, etc.¹²

The difficulty lays in locating a nation. Austria and Germany have the same national language but are not considered as one nation. Language itself does not define a nation.¹³ Peru and Ecuador have the same language and a quite similar history, but yet they are not considered as one single nation. Examples like this are very easy and numerous to find. By locating a nation, it seems to be more important to find a common sense of being a nation, a kind of collective feeling. In other words: a national identity.¹⁴ As mentioned above, characteristics like language, history, etc. can create this national identity. Only if a national identity arises within the populace and it is not independent enough, separatism, and its associated nationalism, has a high potential to come into existence.¹⁵ The importance of identity can be underlined with the definition of a nation state; a political community with the ability to exercise a monopoly of political authority and legitimate force, the ability to allocate the resources in the society and the possession of the loyalty and support amongst the population, respectively the political identification.¹⁶

2.1.2 Ethnic Groups

Ethnic groups – in some literature also called cultural nations¹⁷ – are difficult to separate from the notion of a nation mentioned above. They represent people with the same culture or cultural background. The main difference between the two notions is that a nation can consist of several ethnic groups but not vice versa.¹⁸ Examples for this might again be Switzerland or South Africa: one nation which includes several, more or less different, ethnic groups with diverse cultural aspects such as the language or traditions. Ethnic groups do not always have the aim to become a separate and self-governing nation but to be integrated, recognized and protected in a bigger society or state by modifying laws and institutions to make them more accommodating for cultural differences.¹⁹ Other than the nationalism of nations, the ethnic nationalism tries to preserve itself in a system rather than create a new one.²⁰ Preservation includes the perception of intergenerational continuity, language practices and cultural practices and models.²¹

¹⁰ Safran, in Moreno / Lecours (eds.), *Nacionalismo y Democracia – Dicotomías, complementariedades, oposiciones*, pp. 37-38.

¹¹ Odendahl, in Nohlen / Grotz (eds.), *Kleines Lexikon der Politik*, p. 297.

¹² Marchal 2006, pp. 22-23 / Odendahl, in Nohlen / Grotz (eds.), *Kleines Lexikon der Politik*, p. 297.

¹³ Smith 1983, p.182.

¹⁴ Malinova / Casula, in Moreno / Lecours (eds.) *Nacionalismo y democracia – Dicotomías, complementariedades, oposiciones*, pp. 287-288.

¹⁵ Smith, in Williams (ed.) *National Separatism*, p. 17.

¹⁶ MacIver, in Williams (ed.) *National Separatism*, p. 300.

¹⁷ Laible 2008, p. 61.

¹⁸ Peleg, in Moreno / Lecours (eds.) *Nacionalismo y democracia - Dicotomías, complementariedades, oposiciones*, p. 73.

¹⁹ Kymlicka 1995, pp. 11-12.

²⁰ Laible 2008, p. 51.

²¹ Schmidt 2008, p. 6.

The latter shows that ethnic groups are closely linked to the term “nation”, including the self-concept of its identity. Psychologically described, having an identity with a certain sub-group helps establishing a perception of oneself, to link it with the rest of the world and to provide the feeling of self-esteem and belonging which is essentially deemed.²² Identity explains the existence of nations, ethnic groups and nationalism.

2.1.3 The Nature of Independency

John Breuilly says that a “nation must be as independent as possible”²³. Having in mind the above mentioned, this could be seen as a pronunciamiento for separatism. Independency and the achievement of it are only related to the answers of two serious questions; First of all, can an independent state survive e.g. economically? And second of all can the new independent state pursue independent policies?²⁴

Examining whether an independent state can pursue independent policies, the question what an independent policy is, will be faced. By joining the EU and vesting sovereign rights onto the supranational level, it could be argued that no EU-MS is able to provide it anymore.²⁵ Using this argument, it can be said that either nationalism in Europe does not exist anymore – because fully independent statehood is no longer an option in the political system – or that the new nationalism considers the full sovereignty as unnecessary. The latter would lead the new focus on language, ethnicity and regional autonomy.²⁶ An answer to the question how sovereign the MS still are and in how far the EU becomes a federal state, will not be given in this paper. It concentrates on the question in how far the regionalism will be strengthened to lead to separatism to produce independence or home-rule / self-governance.

2.1.4 The Nature of Home Rule

In the science of administrative and constitutional law, Home Rule is known as a practical organisation chart which contains two different functions: the principle of opposition and the principle of correlation. The first shall, thanks to home rule, shield the sub-unit from the superior state. Simultaneously, the latter shall direct all actions for the common welfare in the superior state.²⁷ In other words: Home Rule, in certain way, is understood as an independent – but integrated into a centric state – organisational sub-unit under public law which, having sole responsibility, can administrate certain public matters.

Transforming this into the context of nationalism, home rule or self-governance is probably the optimal solution for nationalists – and separatists – to maximize independence or to capture the norm of sovereignty inside the European political order. Considering the problem of defining the sovereignty of states in the EU-System, it is obviously easier to achieve home rule than to create a proper state and might increasingly enforce the new, own decision-making powers.²⁸

2.1.5 Summary and usage in the present paper

Separatism is a form of nationalism which may arise if nations are not independent enough. Cultural characteristics are important to define nations. But to find separatism, there is need to demand more independence. The demand for more independence is highly important for na-

²² *Fitjar* 2010, p. 3.

²³ *Breuilly* 1993, p. 2.

²⁴ *King* 1973, p. 61.

²⁵ *Craig / de Búrca* 2008, p. 346.

²⁶ *Laible* 2008, p. 27.

²⁷ *Möller* 2008, p. 77.

²⁸ *Laible* 2008, p. 37.

tions but different from one to another. Nationalism does not necessarily lead to separatism and can be compensated by increasing autonomy. This paper will see if economic aspects might as well lead to separatism and if there are measures to compensate it.

2.2 Regions inside a state

Before the term regionalism will be explained, an adequate definition on regions is to find. It will be done under legal and political aspects. Regionalism itself will be highlighted in chapter 2.3.

By defining the notion “region”, another problem is faced: in general, there is no universal definition which fits for all kinds of disciplines but for each single subject and each scientific view. Not even all the European states could accept a specific definition of a region²⁹ due to their individual state structure and domestically conflicts. Some authors call this term: “a multidiscipline notion”³⁰. According to a broad definition, a region is a coherent, middle sized subspace, earmarked by specific attributes of an entire space.³¹ Regions can be understood either as *single feature* or *multiple feature regions*. The first identifies a region by just one single characteristic, such as an economic or historic one. The second notion characterizes regions with various indications.³² A region can also be understood as a functional region, such as economic -, labour market- or cross border regions or a normative classification as administrative unit on a sub-national level.³³ Adding the term of a political region³⁴, it shows how broad and different the concepts are. For reasons of convenience, the terminology of supranational actors will be considered as well.

2.2.1 Legal definition

In this part, all legally binding definitions will be presented. The TEU mentioned two advisory bodies for the EP, the CM and the COM.³⁵ Among the EESC, the COR is one of this advisory bodies. More information about what a region defines is not to be found in the TEU. In none of the Treaties a definition of a region is given and that means that the legal term, insofar, remains unclear. The previous treaties did also not include any definition on regions. It is justified by assigning that regions and its definitions are part of the internal arrangement of each MS but not of the EU.³⁶

In the 1970s, Eurostat created the terminology of NUTS which divides all MSs in statistical areas of three or more different levels by the main criteria of population. Political, administrative and institutional conditions as well as non-administrative units can be considered as criterion, too, but should never contrast the main criteria of population in any moment.³⁷

Each MS is divided into NUTS 1 regions which are then divided into NUTS 2 levels. Each NUTS 2 area consists of several NUTS 3 regions. Depending on the population and its single administrative system – keeping all policy-making power on the central state level –, a MS

²⁹ Tauras 1997, p. 19.

³⁰ Lautner 1999, p. 40.

³¹ Sinz, in: *Akademie für Raumforschung und Raumplanung (ed.)*, Handwörterbuch der Raumordnung, p. 805.

³² Schobben, in: *European Union (ed)*, Committee of the Regions thesis competition 1996-2003, pp. 115.

³³ Föhn 2003, p. 12.

³⁴ Schobben, in: *European Union (ed)*, Committee of the Regions thesis competition 1996-2003, pp. 116.

³⁵ Art. 13 IV TEU.

³⁶ Weatherill, in: *Weatherhill/Bernitz (eds.)*, The role of regions and sub-national actors in Europe – essay in European law, pp. 1-2.

³⁷ Regulation (EC) No 1059/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 May 2003 on the establishment of a common classification of territorial units for statistics (NUTS).

could be composed of just one NUTS 1, one NUTS 2 and one NUTS 3 region. NUTS 0 matches the entire MS territory.³⁸

Level	Minimum	Maximum
NUTS 1	3 mio	7 mio
NUTS 2	800 000	3 mio
NUTS 3	150 000	800 000

Table 1 NUTS classification by population³⁹

As prime reason, this division is made for statistical comparison. From the beginning 1970's on, it was just unofficially used by Eurostat. In 2003, the EP and CM decreed regulation 1059/2003 including the definition of NUTS. Other binding legal acts which define regions are not to be found.⁴⁰

2.2.2 Political definition

A political definition of regions would be any declaration which is not per se legally binding and made by an international political actor. Declarations of the COE, the EP or the AER help understanding the common notion of a region. In 1978, the council of Europe, with no.4 of the Declaration of Bordeaux, defined a region as a human community in a territorial unit of a country. This community is united by historical, cultural, geographical or economic homogeneity or in combination with them.⁴¹ In 1988, the EP signed the Community Charter for Regionalisation and defined that regions are clear geographical territories – or a conjunction of it – with elements which unite their respective citizens in a cultural, social and economic way including their will to strengthen and develop it.⁴² The AER states that “[t]he term "Region" covers in principle local authorities immediately below the level of central government, with a political power of representation embodied by an elected regional Assembly”⁴³.

2.2.3 Summary and usage in the present paper

Taking in consideration the definitions mentioned above, a region is determined by 4 indicators;

- A delimitable territory with a
- Certain identity or factors which unify the citizens, especially language, history, culture or economy;
- Integrated into the territory or a state below the level of a central government – to separate this notion from international regions;
- And an own independent organisational structure with certain democratic minimum requirements. This includes as well certain conferred competence such like own funding, administrative and / or legislative powers.

³⁸ Eurostat, NUTS classification, January 2010, NUTS is a hierarchical classification, available at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/region_cities/regional_statistics/nuts_classification (29 April 2010).

³⁹ Eurostat, NUTS classification, January 2010, NUTS is a hierarchical classification, available at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/region_cities/regional_statistics/nuts_classification (29 April 2010).

⁴⁰ Brasche 2008, p. 194.

⁴¹ Gerdes in: Klein/Legrand/Leif (eds.), Neue soziale Bewegung – Impulse, Bilanzen und Perspektiven, pp. 292-293.

⁴² Föhn 2003, p. 13.

⁴³ Art. 2 Nr. 2 of the Statutes of the AER.

By considering different fields and subjects related in to regions, it is very difficult to provide a universal definition for this term. Nevertheless, this paper will pay most attention to the four summarized characteristics and uses them to define a region.

2.3 The theory and policy for regions

Both terms are often used in the same context. It is clearly of avail to clarify the differences and relation between these two notions. Regionalism will first be explained and compared with nationalism. Reasons for ERP will be described. A closer discussion on ERP is to be found in chapter 4.2.

2.3.1 Regionalism

Regionalism, however, is – such like the term “Region” – a very imprecise notion and can be used in several contexts. Depending on the extent, the notion “region” is understood as international regions, including several states (not used in this paper) or as smaller sized regions such as those inside a state. The same extent defines the term “regionalism”. In other words: regionalism is a term used on the intra- or supra-national level enclosing cultural, socio-economic and political entities, ideas / identities, ambitions / movements, procedures as well as organisations.⁴⁴ In an economic comparison with separatism, regionalism tries to better the allocation of resources, redistribution of incomes and stabilization of the whole economy in the best way.⁴⁵ The focus on an economic point of view can easily be found in the literature. The main reason for the COM and the other institutions to support the idea of integrating the regions of Europe into the EU-system was to compensate the growing economic imbalance between the regions.⁴⁶ Regionalism is therefore a *result* of the exigency of the regional development especially of poor regions.⁴⁷ By regional development the focus is broadened from just the economic to other aspects, like culture or decentralization of political powers provided by a central state, as well.⁴⁸ These explanations are mostly used on a national or supra-national level.

2.3.1.1 Regionalism as Pre-Nationalism?

The new approach to explain regionalism is to compare it with nationalism, which rises from the existence of a nation, including its national identity. Regionalism might accordingly arise from regions, including their regional identities. In conclusion, a new identity, maybe competing or additionally to the national one, appears.⁴⁹ The most common sense describes the new identity as in addition to the national one. It explains regionalism as *adjustment* of regional development among regions in general, including all social, economic and cultural aspects. Political actors on sub-national level use this definition.⁵⁰ It seems reasonable to assume that a regional identity can be additional at one point but competitive at another. Depending on the importance and the amount of “competitive” subjects, regionalism can lead to nationalism and to separatism, not leaving the social and environmental conditions and the degree of integration of the sub-unit – region, nation or ethnic group – in the nation state out of question.⁵¹

Apart from the integration of the sub-units, the current regional wealth can lead to nationalistic or even separatist feelings. Separatism is more common in poorer regions but as a new

⁴⁴ Nohlen, in Nohlen / Grotz (eds.), Kleines Lexikon der Politik, p. 476.

⁴⁵ King 1973, p. V.

⁴⁶ Ruge 2003, p. 291.

⁴⁷ Ibid, p. 292.

⁴⁸ Fitjar 2010, p. 2.

⁴⁹ Ibid, p. 4.

⁵⁰ Ibid, p. 5.

⁵¹ MacIver, in Williams (ed.) National Separatism, pp. 300-301.

tendency rich areas more and more consider splitting off the poorer ones to avoid the financial follow-ups of solidarity.⁵² The Italian Lega Nord temporarily is a good example for this.

2.3.1.2 Results of regionalism

The so-called “regional national identity” does not necessarily lead to state dissolution in case that there are institutional structures which suite its requirements. In this case, regional national pressure can force the national state to adjust its system and to increase regional autonomous policy-making.⁵³ Regionalism, including its regional identity, hence does control the central government and protects the interests of a particular group. It could be considered as challenge to the central state to improve its system and might create pressures for devolution.⁵⁴ However, the EU’s effect on decentralisation still depends on MS’s internal polity, because the national legal order, including the constitutions, clarify interaction between regions and the central government, and vary from MS to MS.⁵⁵

Regionalism obviously had an effect on the EU system by shaping the political concept of “Europe of the Regions”, including and enforcing the principle of subsidiarity and creating and strengthening the COR.⁵⁶ The fear of strengthening the sub-national level in the multi-level-governance of the EU so that national level will be redundant, is neither realistic nor comprehensible at this point. First of all, the regions did neither have the same competences all over Europe nor will that happen in the future.⁵⁷ Secondly, regionalism might – but not necessarily have to – lead to nationalism – on some point, also to separatism – and would create a new state on the national level which might try to join the EU.⁵⁸

2.3.2 European Regional Policy

European regional policy concentrates on the balancing of regional economic development. Therefore, the EU redistributes money through several different funds to counter the divergence of the regions and the core-periphery pattern.⁵⁹ European integration had, economically speaking, several appearances over time. There was a clear convergence and sometimes Europe experienced economic divergence. In the last 10 years, it can be observed that there is an economic convergence, including a catch-up process, among the MS, but a clear divergence inside the MS and among regions.⁶⁰

The core-periphery pattern shows some similar facts; there are regional differences between areas based in the core of the EU, areas located in the intermediate and areas in the periphery. Periphery is characterized by a relatively big territory, with a relatively small density of population but, compared with the rest of the EU high population and a low income. It mainly includes the new East-European MSs: Greece, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Sweden and Finland. The latter two are included because of their low population density and not due to their income rates. By contrast the core area includes a small but relatively high populated territory with a relatively high income. This includes the BENELUX countries and parts of Germany, France and the UK.⁶¹

⁵² *Brasche* 2008, p. 195.

⁵³ *Dudek* 2005, p. 79.

⁵⁴ *Ibid* 2005, pp.40-41.

⁵⁵ *Ibid* 2005, p. 79.

⁵⁶ *Brasche* 2008, p. 196.

⁵⁷ *Blanke* 2002, p. 71 / *Saller* 1999, p. 239.

⁵⁸ *Laible* 2008, pp. 24-25.

⁵⁹ *Brasche* 2008, pp. 225-226.


⁶⁰ *Molle* 2007, p. 33 / *Cuadrado-Roura / Maroto-Sánchez*, in *Cuadrado-Roura (ed.)*, Regional Policy, Economic Growth and Convergence – Lessons from the Spanish Case, p. 165.

⁶¹ *Baldwin / Wyplosz* 2009, pp. 383-385.

	Population in %		Number of Regions		
	GDP p.c. ≥ average	GDP p.c. ≤ average	GDP p.c. ≥ average	GDP p.c. ≤ average	Total
Core	88,8	11,2	77	11	88
Intermediate	70,3	29,7	35	24	59
Periphery	18,1	81,9	23	88	111

Table 2 Territorial cohesion / core-periphery pattern⁶²

Both approaches lead to an economic imbalance between the regions and that is tried to be abolished by the ERP. It includes nowadays the ERDF, pre-accession interventions related to structural policies, the ESF, the EUSF and the Cohesion Fund.⁶³ Both the fund for pre-accession interventions related to structural policies and the EUSF are for specific decided regions – either regions of future MS or regions where a catastrophe happened – and are not open for an application procedure.⁶⁴ Primarily the Cohesion fund has been introduced to support the poor MS to join the EMU.⁶⁵ The mentioned funds are only valid for the period 2007-2013. Before, in period 2000-2006, there have been different funds and a different classification of regions.⁶⁶



Graphic 1 Core-periphery pattern⁶⁷

Today, regions are considered as Convergence-, Phasing-out-, Phasing-in- and Competitive-ness-and-Employment-regions, whereas Phasing-out-regions belong to the Convergence ones

⁶² *European Commission DG Regional Policy, Second report on economic and social cohesion – I.3 Territorial cohesion: towards a more balanced development, April 2001,*

http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/official/reports/pdf/p13_en.pdf (29 April 2010).

⁶³ *European Commission DG Regional policy 2009, pp. 5-9 / Daman (European Commission DG Regional Policy) 2006, p. 2.*

⁶⁴ *European Commission DG Regional policy 2009, pp. 8-9.*

⁶⁵ *Brasche 2008, p. 226.*

⁶⁶ *Baldwin / Wyplosz 2009, pp. 241-246.*

⁶⁷ *European Commission DG Regional Policy, Second report on economic and social cohesion – Map A.4 Central and peripheral regions, April 2001,*

http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/official/reports/pdf/mapa4_de.pdf (29 April 2010).

and Phasing-in-regions are considered as subject to Competitiveness-and-Employment. All marked with “convergence” are able to apply for all three funds whereas the rest can only apply for the ERDF and / or EUSF.⁶⁸

As mentioned before, regionalism includes more than just the economic aspects of regional development. It can be argued that European regional policy is a tool to meet the economic requirements of regionalism to strengthen its region.

2.4 European identity and Europeanism

Having the idea of additional or competitive identity in mind, it seems reasonable to analyse if there is an European identity and if it is additional or competitive to the national and regional ones. It seems evident that such identity leads to Europeanism such as the regional one does to regionalism and the national one to nationalism.

2.4.1 Feeling of Identity in Europe

To define and to find the European identity depends on its criteria. The criteria mentioned for finding regional or national identity such as common language, culture, history or religion, can easily be discussed. It is obvious that there is no common European language. Christianity as religious criteria is not suitable, due to its internal heterogeneity (catholic, protestant, orthodox). Finally, the cultural and historical aspects are too wide-spread to be called as common European.⁶⁹ Only the approach of a “community of common values”, taking in consideration all common constitutional principles, such as the respect for human and fundamental rights, democracy and the rule of law, is free of discussion and uniformly accepted and hence suitable. Consequently, this is also used by the European political actors.⁷⁰

From the perspective of each citizen, it seems to be reasonable to develop an European identity if one receives information about the EU, realises positive effects and considers it as very important. Not surprising, this applies to non-low educated people, especially those who speak several languages and work in an already Europe-wide liberalised field.⁷¹ The Eurobarometer 65 survey – published by the COM – shows that 40% of all EU-citizens identify solely with their national identity (leaving aside the regional identity). The rest identifies either exclusively or additionally with the European identity.⁷² This result could also arise due to one’s own interests. Examples like business men, students and academics, government employees and lawyers living and working at least for a couple of time abroad in Europe, might explain the result of the survey. It shows that interests and interactions are non-neglectable facts for finding the European identity.⁷³

⁶⁸ *Daman (European Commission DG Regional Policy) 2006, p. 2 / European Commission DG Regional Policy 2009, pp. 5-9.*


⁶⁹ *Cerutti, in Meyer / Eisenberger (eds.), Europäische Identität als Projekt – Innen- und Aussensicht, p. 254.*

⁷⁰ *Kadelbach 2008, p. 12 / Brasche 2008, p. 11.*

⁷¹ *Fligstein 2008, p.123.*

⁷² *Kadelbach 2008, p. 14.*

⁷³ *Fligstein 2008, p. 139.*



Graphic 2 Dutch survey about national or European identity⁷⁴

The Dutch “nee”, and the French “non”, in the referenda about the constitutional treaty was, among others, a result of their national identity competing with the European one.⁷⁵ No doubt that the Dutch as well feel an European identity. First of all due to results presented in Graphic 2, and secondly because 74%⁷⁶ of the Netherlands’ citizens think the EU is something good.

Some newspapers claimed that there is no common European identity at all.⁷⁷ Graphic 3 shows that there is at least a feeling of European identity. To answer the question, what ones feeling of identity is, four answers were given: “European and national”, “first European and afterwards national”, “first national and afterwards European” and “only national”. In this poll, regional identity was not considered. All MSs have been directly after accession included in this survey.⁷⁸

There are five general ideas to describe this feeling of identity among EU citizens. First: identification with a superior Europe as a highly advanced society, even more than others, and in all areas of human attempts; such as political institutions, science or lifestyle. Secondly, there is the identification with the European interior – cultural, economic, political, or moral – confronting all cultures of the rest of the world. A third identification can be seen in Europe as an actor in a mission of global modernization. Fourthly, Europe could be considered as one civilization among several others and in friendly competition with other non-European societies and civilizations. Finally, the fifth is focusing on an inward-looking identification based on Europe’s internal diversity according to the sense of the EU; “unified in diversity”.⁷⁹

⁷⁴ Kaina 2009, p. 60.


⁷⁵ Nicolai 2006, p. 35.

⁷⁶ European Commission, Standard EB 72 Autumn2009, January 2010, Page 3. The EU and its citizens; QA7, available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb72/eb72_fact_nl_en.pdf (26 April 2010).

⁷⁷ Medrano, in: Checkel / Katzenstein (eds.), European Identity, p. 84.

⁷⁸ Kaina 2009, pp. 58-59.

⁷⁹ Kaelble, in Checkel / Katzenstein (eds.), European Identity, pp. 198-199.



Graphic 3 Survey about the feeling of identity among EU citizens⁸⁰

In the end, it is not important for this paper to analyse in which way one identifies with the EU. It essentially matters that there is a feeling of identity which is additional⁸¹ to the national one and – yet – cannot compete with the national or the regional one, although there might be no common European nation⁸².

2.4.2 Europeanism as result of its identity

A feeling of identity is in the same way strongly related to an internal connectivity as to an external deferral. Culturally and politically speaking, this makes it necessary – just as claimed – to include the citizens in the policy-making process. A political system can only be successful with the acceptance of its habitants.⁸³ Europeanism, in this sense, signifies an internal urge to reach the inclusion mentioned as well as a self-understanding to distinguish themselves from others. The first can be seen in the increasing level – from treaty amendment to another overtime – of democratic legitimacy – or reducing level of the democratic deficit – by e.g. increasing the powers of the EP, more provisions to hear the COR and the new procedure of citizens' initiative.⁸⁴ Symbols like the EU-flag or anthem or rights like the Union-citizenship or the EU-Charter of human rights can be more or less understood in the internal and the external aspect.⁸⁵ External deferral is reached politically e.g. by creating the position of Ms. Ashton: High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.⁸⁶ As far as the cultural aspect is concerned, it is difficult to find examples. Finally, you can argue that even there are big differences between each region, culturally speaking, it is still clear that the Europeans recognizes their common history and cultural bound and origin.⁸⁷ The definition of Europe as a community of common values⁸⁸, the motto of “unified in diversity”⁸⁹ and the mentality change of euro-sceptic movements – from “dissolving the EU” to “not this kind of EU but a better one”⁹⁰ – can clearly be seen as deferral to the exterior world. Even the EU's acceptance of the WTO and the COE, or their willingness to do so, are examples of external

⁸⁰ *Ibid* 2009, p. 59.

⁸¹ *Checkel / Katzenstein* 2009, p. 216 / *Kadelbach* 2008, p. 15.

⁸² *Fligstein* 2008, p. 244.

⁸³ *Mandry* 2009, p. 109-112.

⁸⁴ *Ibid* 2009, p. 111.

⁸⁵ *Ibid* 2009, p. 108.

⁸⁶ Art. 18 II TEU.

⁸⁷ *Mandry* 2009, p. 117.

⁸⁸ *Ibid* 2009, p. 123.

⁸⁹ *Müller-Graff* 2009, p. 5.

⁹⁰ *Schymik* 2006, pp. 321-322 / *Weigelt*, in *Strohmeier*, Die Europäische Union – Ein Kompendium aus deutscher Sicht, pp. 41-42.

recognition.⁹¹ Especially the legal achievements and the money distribution for regional authorities can be seen as strong requirement of this kind of Europeanism.

2.4.3. Europeanism as part of nationalism

Europeanism understood as a kind of nationalism, is difficult to prove. As mentioned above, nationalism needs a nation and it is clear that even there is an additional feeling of identity within the EU, it is not consisting of one big nation. But to understand Europeanism as a leading direction or a new form of the current nationalism might be easier to prove. The concept of a new nationalism created by the strong regionalism can be seen in the system of the EU and its political environment. It provides that nationalism can be expressed politically without the need of a separate and total sovereign state.⁹² Again, the view on the EU as a community of common values and the unity in diversity will be applicable.⁹³

On a closer look, the political possibility of expression can lead to two different effects: separatists become moderate nationalists or regionalists or separatism become strengthened. The first can be explained by Europe giving them a possibility to obtain certain power – i.e. principle of subsidiarity, political integration, recognition – and by reducing the feeling of being overruled by a centric state. As a result, there would be the reduction of separatist movements and stronger feeling of integration. On the other hand, the European political possibilities could result in achieving a status of autonomy as a preliminary stage of full independence.⁹⁴

The result obviously depends on each situation, on separatist movements and on their reasons to be. Considering that all international organisations – including the EU – strengthen the concept of sovereign states, recognize their sovereignty and that states still support other states – the juridical equality of state among each other – the realistic high probability of utilizing the European system to achieve the ultimate goal of a sovereign state is proven.⁹⁵

Europeanism is characterized and understood by the EU itself as the existence of the “community of values” which is “unified in diversity”. Both are closely linked and describe the recognition of common roots, e.g. religions or cultural, and varieties at the same time by all European actors – political, economic and civil.⁹⁶ Political decisions only seem to have a possibility to survive in the long term if they manage to combine both the unity and diversity aspect. Common values help finding the first mentioned and to protect the system from chaos by too much diversity.⁹⁷ The integration of regions in the EU-system, by e.g. the COR or the principle of subsidiarity, increases the diversity and shield it from too much unity and possible parochialism.⁹⁸

2.5 Summary

Separatism is a kind of nationalism whereas regionalism can be considered either as pre-nationalism or as an additional force towards nationalism. Europeanism and regionalism –

⁹¹ WTO, Member Information – The European Union and the WTO, Dec 2009, available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/european_communities_e.htm (12 May 2010) / Council of the European Union, 29th Quadripartite meeting between the Council of Europe and the European Union – Luxembourg – 27 October 2009 Conclusions, p. 2, para. 2, Oct 2009, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/110822.pdf (12 May 2010).

⁹² Laible 2008, p. 27.

⁹³ Lehmann, in Dahm (ed.), Europa – eine Wertegemeinschaft?, pp. 47-48.

⁹⁴ Laible 2008, pp. 34-35.


⁹⁵ Laible 2008, p. 35.

⁹⁶ Friedrich, in Dahm (ed.), Europa – Eine Wertegemeinschaft?, pp. 145-147.

⁹⁷ Friedrich, in Dahm (ed.), Europa – Eine Wertegemeinschaft?, p. 147.

⁹⁸ Loughlin 1999, p. 351.

including their own identities – can be competing with nationalism and its national identity or additional to them. Nationalism / Separatism, Regionalism and Europeanism are mainly defined by their individual identity. If the regional identity converts into a national identity, separatism seems to be much more probable. However, Europeanism, European identity and Europe's regionalism have either a unifying effect and reduce the possibility of separatism, or increase the possibility of separatism by strengthening, e.g. economically, some regions. These are the theoretical considerations. The following graphic shows the relation between the notions:



Graphic 4 Graphical relation between Europeanism, nationalism, regionalism and separatism and their identities.⁹⁹

In the following this paper will deal with the question in how far the legal and economic aspect leads to which result. Later on, there will be a detailed look on the Kingdom of Denmark.

3. Legal Aspects

As seen in the chapter before, separatist movements arise if certain groups are not integrated, not recognized or even burked. This chapter will consider in how far the regions are integrated, recognized and evaluated by legal acts, provisions or principles in Europe.

3.1 Principle of Subsidiarity

The topic of the principle of subsidiarity has been frequently used in dissertations and elitist discussions. This paper explains it short, but nevertheless precise enough to understand the reasoning of its thesis. A deeper discussion of it can be found in the corresponding literature.

3.1.1 Origin of Subsidiarity and Linguistic Definition

This principle has been used mainly in theology, but is also discussed in social philosophical ideas of several classical scholars – beginning with Aristotle, atop Thomas of Aquin, Althusius, Immanuel Kant – and is today one of the political principles in the Lisbon treaties.¹⁰⁰ Subsidiarity originates – according to the common sense – from the Latin words of “subsidiere” – to be below something – and “subsidium” – assistance. It is understood as the actual support and assistance of a high level-unit by a lower level sub-unit to ensure the antecedence of responsibility of these sub-units. Therefore, the principle of subsidiarity is called “maxim of assistance responsibility”.¹⁰¹

⁹⁹ Own interpretation.

¹⁰⁰ Möller 2008, pp. 30-36 / Estella 2002, pp. 77-80.

¹⁰¹ Möller 2008, pp. 22-23.

3.1.2 Legal and political definition

In a legal or political meaning, the linguistic definition is way too narrow and needs to be examined on a deeper level. The principle of subsidiarity can be seen as a maxim of allocation of tasks to promote the merging of a system by harmonising the natural antagonisms of autonomy and solidarity or liberty and hierarchical order.¹⁰² It serves the purpose to justify the autonomy of smaller entities (both private and public) and therefore implies an obstacle to the expansion of larger entities' (both private and public) respective spheres of nation. Once the hurdle of subsidiarity is cleared, larger entities may start to act.¹⁰³ By involving all levels in a system through the principle of subsidiarity, essential issues can be put into effect in the most optimal way. Economically speaking, policies should be handled by the smallest jurisdictions that can exploit economies of scales and internalize the externalities of the policy.¹⁰⁴ Ideally, the smallest level in a system shall thus cover a duty not only because it is able to do so, but because it delivers the best results in carrying it out.¹⁰⁵ Therefore, it can be considered not only as a maxim of allocation of tasks or responsibility, but also as an axiom of system organisation. It helps not only including sub-unit but also to solve organisational problems in a bigger system.¹⁰⁶ Understood as political principle it clearly is a result of the ideology of liberalism by limiting the power and responsibility of the state in order to underline individuality and transferring it to each "person".¹⁰⁷ "Person" in this case has to be understood as the smallest element in a system. The idea behind that is that each "person" will act totally independent but with the objective to reach the best possible solution and therefore strengthen the wealth of the collective.¹⁰⁸ In the system of the EU, the principle leaves most responsibilities to the national and, especially, sub-national governments.¹⁰⁹ Not least, it is most important to reduce the legitimacy problems of the EU and to increase the political identity of every political actor and citizen with the EU.¹¹⁰

3.1.3 Subsidiarity in the EU-System

Compared with the definitions mentioned above, subsidiarity is understood as inclusion of the regions into the whole process of decision-making to obtain the best results. The question is what happens in a system which would be totally state-centric organised, if the principle of subsidiarity has been introduced from outside. E.g. a totally state-centric country would usually not use any kind of subsidiarity, but by joining the EU it had to confer several competences onto the EU level¹¹¹. But the EU level, now, conferred certain powers back onto the regions by using this principle. The mentioned state-centric country might not have even considered doing so. It can be seen that the EU and its application of subsidiarity should, in order to secure efficiency, promote regional autonomous policy-making and further free sub-national governments from national and supranational infringement upon their policy-making and implementing abilities.¹¹² At least the regions, and regionalism in general, are strength-

¹⁰² Gamper, in Gamper / Bußjäger (eds.) Subsidiarität anwenden: Regionen, Staaten, Europäische Union – La Sussidiarietà Applicata: Regioni, Stati, Unione Europea, pp. 109-110.

¹⁰³ Estella 2002, p. 80.

¹⁰⁴ Alesina / Spolaore 2003, p. 220.

¹⁰⁵ Gamper, in Gamper / Bußjäger (eds.) Subsidiarität anwenden: Regionen, Staaten, Europäische Union – La Sussidiarietà Applicata: Regioni, Stati, Unione Europea, p. 112.

¹⁰⁶ Möller 2008, p. 24.

¹⁰⁷ Estella 2002, pp. 80-81.

¹⁰⁸ Möller 2008, p. 36.

¹⁰⁹ Dudek 2005, p. 23.

¹¹⁰ Estella 2002, p. 76.

¹¹¹ Craig / de Búrca 2008, p. 346.

¹¹² Dudek 2005, p. 23.

ened by this maxim. Subsidiarity and the nature of home rule are linked in certain ways to such extent that subsidiarity could be considered as an adjustment factor for regional development.¹¹³ Powers, which the centric state might not have passed to its regions, are now conferred to them and the regional identity can be strengthened.

The Lisbon Treaty provides the subsidiarity as one of the basic principles of the EU.¹¹⁴ By it, the EU policy-making process includes not only the regional and local government, but even increasingly enables the national governments. It also increases the controlling-powers of the sub-national actors in all EU legislations acts. To sum up, it increases the right to regional self-governance in the framework of an ever closer European integration.¹¹⁵ Taking this in mind, the regionalism, its governments and its self-governance are more and more protected by being integrated simultaneously into the policy-making processes. In conclusion, subsidiarity strengthens the regionalism and its possible separatist movements but integrates them into the creational process of new policies at the same time and decreases the possibility of separatist movements. Subsidiarity insofar might lead to separatism but more probably decrease it. The result of subsidiarity to promote separatism is very unlikely and depends on different and much stronger factors – e.g. regional or national identity.

3.2 Committee of the Regions

In how far are the regions already integrated in the EU policy-making process and how did the power increase over time? This question will be answered in this chapter. Firstly, the origin and development of the Committee of the Regions will be presented. Secondly, the current situation including some future possibilities will be examined.

3.2.1 Origin and development

Thanks to the Maastricht Treaty, the regions of Europe got a political body – called the Committee of the Regions – to participate in the EU policy-making process. It is a political assembly of regional and local levels which renders to give these levels a voice in EU policy development and its legislation. Creating the advisory Council of Regional and Local Administrative Units, in the end of the 80s, the COM made the first steps towards a political integration of European regions.¹¹⁶ Shortly before this, the regions created the Assembly of the European Regions and the European Charter of Local Self-Government – prepared by the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities and accepted by the European Council – came into force. Both, the AER and the CLRA, did a lot of lobbying work in the system of the EU to confer more power towards the regions. The result was that both non-EU institutions could propose the members of the advisory council.¹¹⁷

Regions with stronger policy-making power had concerns to work in an advisory council together with regions having less or almost no power at all and criticised its weak institutional position. The result was that such “powerful” regions ignored this body. Instead, in the end of the 90s, they proposed a European chamber of the regions with the ability to participate actively in the European legislative process. Thanks to the political pressure of the AER, CLRA, the regions themselves, and the good experience made with the advisory council, COR has been created, included in the Maastricht Treaty. Six days after its start of employment, the advisory council had been abolished by being obsolete and replaced by the COR.¹¹⁸

¹¹³ Möller 2008, p. 77.

¹¹⁴ Art. 5 I 2 TEU / Protocol (Nr. 2) on the Application of the Principle of Subsidiarity and Proportionality.

¹¹⁵ Möller 2008, p. 289.

¹¹⁶ Föhn 2003, p. 31.

¹¹⁷ Föhn 2003, p. 32.

¹¹⁸ Saller 1999, p.174.

Several treaty amendments increased the necessity to consult the COR and helped reducing the tensions between the three levels: the supranational level, the national level of the MS and the regional level. People are having a strong regional identity and citizens in general thereby got a feeling of being able to participate on the EU level and to also identify themselves with Europe.¹¹⁹

3.2.2 Current Committee of the Regions

Today the COR is mentioned both in the TEU and the TFEU – both in the version of Lisbon. Only one provision in the TEU named the COR and appoint it with advisory capacities.¹²⁰ Much more citations on the COR are to be found in the TFEU as well as some explanatory and regulatory matters. The chapter 3 under title I in part 6 of TFEU is talking about the advisory bodies and especially Section 2 about the COR. In the beginning, the COR was consisting of representatives of the regions and local bodies appointed by the MS which actually resulted in the fact that some members of the COR were actually part of the central state but representing local or regional interests.¹²¹ Each of the 350 members of the COR¹²² needs to have a regional or local authority electoral mandate or “political accountability to an elected assembly”¹²³ to be proposed by a MS.

Nowadays, the TFEU does not provide a detailed number of regional representatives per country anymore like the ECT did¹²⁴ but does mention that the Council shall adopt unanimously “a decision determining the Committee’s composition.”¹²⁵ Such a decision does not yet exist. Due to the Protocol on Transitional Provisions, which states a detailed allocation of COR members until the mentioned decision comes into force, it is not needed so far.¹²⁶

Even the EP has relatively much more power in the policy-making-process and militated clearly against the empowerment of the COR. Both can be seen as allies in the EU-system. However, the role of representation is clearly different: one is appointed to specific regions – taking even more boarders into account – and the other works on an over-regional – leaving boarders behind – interest.¹²⁷ Therefore, it has to be considered that by the COR and its – over time slow but steady – empowerment, the closeness and integration of the citizens and its regions has been increased. However, in the foreseeable future it is improbable that the COR will achieve such a political role as the “Bundesrat” in Germany or the “Senado” in Spain – playing the role of the second chamber of a bicameral political system.¹²⁸

3.3 Primary EU law

The basic principles and provisions of the EU system are laid down in primary EU law which consists of the Treaties.¹²⁹ All protocols and annexes are also integral part of them.¹³⁰ Therefore, in this chapter, some principles and provision regarding regions, strengthening of regions, and Denmark itself will be considered.

¹¹⁹ *Brasche* 2008, p. 196.

¹²⁰ Art. 13 IV TFEU.

¹²¹ *Saller* 1999, p. 192.

¹²² Art. 305 I TFEU.

¹²³ Art. 300 III TFEU.

¹²⁴ Art. 263 III ECT.

¹²⁵ Art. 305 II TFEU.

¹²⁶ Art. 8 Protocol (No. 36) on Transitional Provisions.

¹²⁷ *Blanke* 2002, pp. 22-23.

¹²⁸ *Blanke* 2002, pp. 55-56.

¹²⁹ *Herdegen* 2005, p. 3.

¹³⁰ Art. 51 TEU.

Each constitution, constitutional text or the Lisbon Treaty begin with a preamble. In general, it includes no legal binding provisions but provides some guidelines and goals to its legal system.¹³¹ The preamble of the TFEU mentions strengthening regional development, promoting regional convergence and supporting poorer regions as a concrete goal of the EU.¹³² Regions, their common wealth and development are therefore seen as one of the highest goals of the EU.

3.3.1 As closely as possible to the citizen

The Lisbon Treaty marks the current stage of integration of creating the new European Union – the EC being completely absorbed in it – as an ever closer union with its decision as open and close as possible to the citizens.¹³³ Even if it is not really clear whether this principle can be used as an legally binding principle for all political actors, it is interpreted as most positive as possible and strengthens insofar not only the citizens itself but also the local and regional government, to such an extent that it is used as strong legal argument for the protectionists of regional empowerment.¹³⁴

3.3.2 Community Charta for Regionalization

It includes several direct rights for regions such like minimum number of institutions, financial autonomy and the right of being part of the policy-making process.¹³⁵ The Community Charta for Regionalization can just be seen as a non-binding political recommendation, a sort of “soft law” but not as a proper legal text.¹³⁶ This is the result of the fact that it is made by a resolution of the European Parliament which is not legally binding.¹³⁷ Even though, it says that it is for the EP’s base for common resolutions, opinions and recommendations.¹³⁸ Therefore, the Community Charter for Regionalization has some political binding effect as a kind of guideline for the EP. Not least did each treaty amendment increase the power of the EP¹³⁹, it indirectly increased the relevance of the charter and thereby the role of the regions as well.

3.3.3 Protocols on Denmark

Denmark has been mentioned in the Treaties mainly as contracting party. In the protocols no. 16, 17, 22 and 32¹⁴⁰ Denmark is explicitly mentioned in some specific matters, especially regarding its opt-outs: non participation in the third stage of the EMU if it does not want to¹⁴¹, non participation on the field of cooperation in police and justice affairs¹⁴² or special rights regarding its legislation on the acquisition of second homes¹⁴³. For the current paper these are not relevant. Only Protocol No. 17 mentions parts of the KOD and affects the Faroe Islands and Greenland indirectly. It states that the Danish National Bank has free rights regarding the monetary policy on territory not being part of the EU, meaning that it has not to act on wishes

¹³¹ Maurer 2007, pp. 130-131.

¹³² 6th passage, Preamble, TFEU.

¹³³ Art 1 II TEU.

¹³⁴ Möller 2008, p. 245.

¹³⁵ Art. 5 / Art. 17 / Art. 24 European Parliament Resolution of 19th of November 1988 on Community regional policy and the role of the regions and Annexed Community Charter for Regionalization, OJ 1988 C329/296.

¹³⁶ Pernthaler 1996, p. 312.

¹³⁷ Herdegen 2005, pp. 165-167.

¹³⁸ European Parliament Resolution of 19th of November 1988 on Community regional policy and the role of the regions and Annexed Community Charter for Regionalization, OJ 1988 C329/289.

¹³⁹ Craig / de Búrca 2008, p. 61.

¹⁴⁰ Leaving all protocols out which are not only concerning Denmark but also every other MS of the EU.

¹⁴¹ No. 3 of the Protocol (No. 16) on certain provisions relating to Denmark.

¹⁴² Art. 2 of the Protocol (No. 22) on the position of Denmark.

¹⁴³ 3. Para. of the Protocol (No. 32) on the acquisition of property in Denmark.

of the ESCB or the ECB.¹⁴⁴ Monetary and economic policy in the Danish autonomous regions are as well falling under the responsibility of the Danish National Bank¹⁴⁵ to ensure their autonomy – including their non participation in the EU – this protocol is from big importance. Summarizing the above mentioned, the protocols on Denmark do not strengthen the role of the Danish regions but do neither weaken it. They only recognize the autonomy already achieved.

3.3.4 Primary law on Danish autonomous regions

According to the TEU, the treaties shall also apply to the Kingdom of Denmark.¹⁴⁶ Considering that the KOD consists of Denmark, the Faroe Islands and Greenland, both autonomous regions would be part of the EU as well. However, it is as well mentioned that the territorial scope of the treaties is detailed in Art. 355 TFEU.¹⁴⁷ According to the treaties, the Faroe Islands are not part of the territorial scope of the EU.¹⁴⁸ Greenland, on the other hand, belongs to the overseas countries and territories with special arrangements and provisions.¹⁴⁹ It means that free trade to and from Greenland is ensured just as investments for its preceding development and the free movement of persons.¹⁵⁰ Notwithstanding, Greenland is mentioned in a specific protocol. It limits the free trade of fishery products from Greenland as long as the EU has no sufficient access to Greenland's fishing zones.¹⁵¹ Again, the primary law of the EU neither strengthens nor weakens Danish regions but respects the status of autonomy already granted.

3.4 Constitutions and Home Rule Acts

In this part the effect of the constitution and the home rule legislation of the KOD will be discussed in short. Further information can be found in chapter 6 later on.

The KOD consists of 3 nations; Denmark, Faroe Islands and Greenland.¹⁵² Denmark is their hegemonic power whereas the Faroese and the Greenlandic nations have the rights of home rule – Greenland since 1979 and the Faroe Islands since 1948 – in their own matters.¹⁵³ Since 1849 the KOD has a modern constitution¹⁵⁴ which is valid according to its latest version in all its nations.¹⁵⁵ The Danish constitution is the highest law inside the Kingdom and regulates the distribution of power in the society, including the parliament and the royal highness. It promotes a stable framework in the political life and the political fight for power and provides the sanctity of the citizen's fundamental rights.¹⁵⁶ The right of regional or local self-government is guaranteed by the Grundloven¹⁵⁷, the Danish constitution. Supervised by the national state, the regional and local authorities are self-governed.¹⁵⁸ In other words, the political empower-

¹⁴⁴ 3. para. of the Protocol (No. 17) on Denmark.

¹⁴⁵ *Danmarks Nationalbank*, Banknotes and Coins, May 2010, para. 4, available at http://www.nationalbanken.dk/DNUK/Tasks.nsf/side/Banknotes_and_coins!OpenDocument (16 May 2010).

¹⁴⁶ Art. 52 I TEU.

¹⁴⁷ Art. 52 II TEU.

¹⁴⁸ Art. 355 IV a) TFEU.

¹⁴⁹ Art. 355 II TFEU in conjunction with the Annex II.

¹⁵⁰ Art. 198 ff. TFEU.

¹⁵¹ Sole Article of Protocol No. 34 on special Arrangements for Greenland.

¹⁵² *Pedersen* 2010, p. 2.

¹⁵³ *Prime Ministers' Office*, Act on the Home Government of the Faeroes, March 1948, Sec. 1, available at <http://www.tinganes.fo/Default.aspx?ID=201> (14 May 2010) / *Statsministeriet*, The Greenland Home Rule Act, Nov 1978, Sec. 1, available at http://www.stm.dk/_p_12712.html (14 May 2010).

¹⁵⁴ *Friiøberg* 1997, p. 23.

¹⁵⁵ *Kimmel* 1996, Art. 1, p. 38.

¹⁵⁶ *Pedersen* 2010, p. 1.

¹⁵⁷ *Kimmel* 1996, p. 51, Art. 82.

¹⁵⁸ *Pedersen* 2010, p. 46.

ment of the regions and municipals is fundamentally protected and integrated into the national state. Movements which ask for more political voice are already present. Considering that a process of decentralisation happened in the 1990s and that regional and local authorities gained more competences and a more powerful voice in the national policy-making process, the integration of the sub-national level reaches in Denmark a high degree.¹⁵⁹

According to the right of self-determination in the public international law and their national, historical and geographical status, the Faroe Islands and Greenland received their own home rule acts.¹⁶⁰ They even share the same constitution with the whole KOD, their autonomy has been strongly amended in the last 10 years.¹⁶¹ It extends to such a degree, that almost every policy field can be taken over by the authorities of both autonomous regions as soon as they are willing to do so. But both home rule legislations are pronouncing the stability of the realm.¹⁶²

To sum up, it has to be said that the constitution of the KOD increases the integration of regional and local authorities. Movements of groups who ask for more political empowerment can rely on the constitution, which in turn makes separatism more unlikely. Nations who fought over time for autonomy received it on a high degree. The Faroe Islands and Greenland can, and have already, overtake almost all policy fields. Regarding their separatist movement to create their own state, it is nothing mentioned in the home rule legislations. Hence, by increasing each autonomy and self-determination of autonomy inside the realm, separatism is neither strengthened nor weakened. Consequently, it must depend on other reasons.

3.5 Non-EU legislation

Outside the jurisdiction of the EU exist numerous international legislation acts, legally binding or not, which cover the topic of ethnic anti-discrimination, minorities and self-government. To stick to European regionalism it will be concentrated on European acts. Two of those are well known and discussed in literature and will be, also due to reasons of simplification, discussed in short below.

3.5.1 Charter of Regional and Minority Languages

Considering the points mentioned above, language is an important characteristic of a nation, an ethnic group or a region. It often is the most obvious fact to be distinctively identified.¹⁶³ Knowing that language matters for, but not defines, nations or ethnic groups, we have – at least shortly – to consider its protection under European legislation.

In 1992, the COE created the most important document for protection of languages in Europe as essential part of the European cultural heritage. Due to the long ratification process, the charter became effective in 1998.¹⁶⁴ Today, 23 MSs of the COE signed and ratified and nine others signed. 14 MSs did not sign it.¹⁶⁵

¹⁵⁹ Loughlin 1999, pp. 63-65.

¹⁶⁰ *Statsministeriet*, The unity of the Realm, 1st passage, available at http://www.stm.dk/a_2752.html (14 May 2010).

¹⁶¹ *Statsministeriet*, The unity of the Realm, 3rd passage, available at http://www.stm.dk/a_2752.html (14 May 2010).

¹⁶² *Statsministeriet*, The Faeroes Islands Self-Government Arrangement, 1st passage, available at http://www.stm.dk/a_2956.html (14 May 2010) / *Statsministeriet*, The Greenland Self-Government Arrangement, 2nd passage, available at http://www.stm.dk/a_2957.html (14 May 2010).

¹⁶³ Neumann 2009, p. 165.

¹⁶⁴ Neumann 2009, p. 143.

¹⁶⁵ *Council of Europe*, European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages CETS No.: 148, Mai 2010, available at <http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=148&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG> (5 Mai 2010).

Its preamble clearly asserts that this charter makes a contribution to the preservation and development of traditions and the cultural richness of the continent. In addition to this, it contributes an essential share to the establishment of Europe's democratic principles.¹⁶⁶ Usually, minority rights, including minority languages, have been protected by anti-discrimination rules – either by constitutional or human rights. The charter is not just a protection rule. It actually obligates the ratified states to protect these languages and to support them to certain extent.¹⁶⁷

In contrast to the COE, the EU does not have a systematic policy regarding languages. Minority and regional languages are mostly protected through anti-discrimination rules than through proper legislative acts.¹⁶⁸ The EP's "Arfé-resolution" enabled the COM to create programs to support languages which are used less. In 1982, that led in the establishment of the European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages in Dublin. This institution observes the progress of programs to promote minority languages.¹⁶⁹ The resolution itself asks for the revivification of minority languages and cultures and to include them into the national curricula to create EU legal acts to support them.¹⁷⁰ Regional and Minority languages seem to be a specific field of "l'exception culturelle" and too complex to be harmonized. Each EU-MS has a very different opinion on this matter. However, it seems not necessary to have an EU policy on regional and minority languages. In general, the international charters, anti-discrimination and minority protection are valid since the EU-MSs are cooperating with the OECD, the UN and the COE on this matter.¹⁷¹ The EU and its institutions just need to apply all policies agreed and ensure them just as the EP has asked in the beginning of the 1980s already.¹⁷² Those policies are obviously increasing the integration of minorities into the national state. By charters like these, the regional identity – including regionalism – is strengthened and promoted as additional to the national identity. As a result: separatist movements are more decreasing than being supported.

3.5.2 European Charter of Local Self-Government

This charter's idea was to create an intergovernmental agreement to promote the rights and freedoms of the regional and local level with similar legal value, like the ECHR or the ESC. Unfortunately, the current charter is quite reduced to substantial requirements. So each MS of the COE was willing to ratify it, the form of a convention, like the ECHR, was rejected.¹⁷³ After World War II, the concept of municipal liberty and free government in Europe rose and represented the solution for wealth and freedom.¹⁷⁴ In general, the charter obliges the state to use basic principles which guarantee political, administrative and financial autonomy of local entities. This mainly includes the principle of subsidiarity.¹⁷⁵ To this day, the charter has been

¹⁶⁶ Neumann 2009, p. 144.

¹⁶⁷ Neumann 2009, p. 162.

¹⁶⁸ Neumann 2009, p. 187.

¹⁶⁹ *European Bureau for Lesser-Used Languages*, Promoting European Linguistic Diversity – About us, May 2010, available at http://www.eblul.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=14 (12 May 2010).

¹⁷⁰ Vizi, in Glatz (ed.), *Die Sprache und die kleinen Nationen Ostmitteleuropas*, p.55.

¹⁷¹ Vizi, in Glatz (ed.), *Die Sprache und die kleinen Nationen Ostmitteleuropas*, p.50.

¹⁷² European Parliament Resolution of 16th October 1981 on a Community Charter of Regional Languages and Cultures and a Charter of Rights of Ethnic Minorities, OJ 1981 C287/106.

¹⁷³ Blair, in Kenmeyer (ed.), *Die Europäische Charta der kommunalen Selbstverwaltung – Entstehung und Bedeutung – Länderberichte und Analysen*, pp. 43-45.

¹⁷⁴ Hyltofte, in Kenmeyer (ed.), *Die Europäische Charta der kommunalen Selbstverwaltung – Entstehung und Bedeutung – Länderberichte und Analysen*, p. 52.

¹⁷⁵ Spautz, in Kenmeyer (ed.), *Die Europäische Charta der kommunalen Selbstverwaltung – Entstehung und Bedeutung – Länderberichte und Analysen*, p. 20.

ratified by 44 of 47 COE-MS. Only the low populated states like San Marino, Andorra and Monaco did not ratify or at least sign it.¹⁷⁶

The European charter for Local Self-Government can be seen as a step towards political autonomy and integration of municipalities in the policy-making process.¹⁷⁷ Together with the principle of subsidiarity it does provide the political empowerment of regions. It could be considered as a factor to increase the possibility of separatism. But: both rather empower the integration into a current system than leading to the creation of a new system or state. Hence, the charter does increase European regionalism. It does not lead to separatism, but might even reduce separatist movements.

3.6 Conclusion

The EU system and the legal structure include all three government levels: EU- level, national- level and regional- level. System elements like the COR, the principle of subsidiarity and the provisions in the primary law are arguments for defining the EU as a system of interweavement par excellence. In other words, the political and social integration is extremely emphasized and that highly increases cooperation, respect and effectiveness of all actors – supranational, national and sub-national – in the policy-making process and the societal life.¹⁷⁸ The idea of all legal provisions is to recognize the current status of the regions, their identity and their development and to enhance the overall integration to promote peaceful co-existence. With the example of Greenland and the Faroe Islands, it is shown that autonomous regions and their status are recognized and protected by the EU-system. By strengthening the factors of regional identity (like languages and culture) and the regional political power, integration is pushed forward. As a result: separatist movements for integrated regions are getting less possible even though legal provisions do not prevent it.

4. Economic Aspects

As mentioned before, the economic reasons for separatism are very important. Not only poor, but also rich regions – the latter just recently – are not happy with the divergence among each other and might develop separatist movements. In how far the ERP and the NRP are involved in this issue and the current situation in Denmark will be considered in short in this chapter. Aids for its autonomous regions will be very briefly mentioned in the later chapter 5 and 6.

4.1 EU Budget

Table 3 describes the distribution of the EU Budget since 1988. It is a gross division in % into agriculture matters, ERP, internal policies, external policies and administration costs. It can be seen that the budget volume for agricultural matters decreased overtime, while grants for ERP increased. The EU and the MSs have noticed the importance of the economic convergence between regions and MSs, and the relevance of European integration as an essential factor for political stability in both, the EU and the MSs. It is apparent by the changed distribution towards ERP or policies regarding convergence between regions over time.¹⁷⁹ On top of that, certain agriculture policies, like fishery policy, or certain internal policies, such as the policy

¹⁷⁶ Council of Europe, European Charter of Local Self-Government – CETS No.: 122, May 2010, available at <http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=122&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG> (12 May 2010).

¹⁷⁷ Hofmann, in Kenmeyer (ed.), Die Europäische Charta der kommunalen Selbstverwaltung – Entstehung und Bedeutung – Länderberichte und Analysen, p. 221.

¹⁷⁸ Tömmel 2003, pp. 277-280.

¹⁷⁹ Tömmel 1994, pp. 402-405.

If for competitiveness for growth, including their aids and funds, are distributing a certain amount of money, indirectly to the regions, depending on their economic structure.¹⁸⁰

The latter mentioned kind of grants will not be examined in this paper. Since 1965 the regional aids increased from 1.6% to 33.6% of the EU-Budget and from almost 0.00% to 0.30% in relation to the EU GNP.¹⁸¹ Considering the fact that the number of MSs increased over the years and thus the overall budget and overall GNP, it is hard to image the real number of the ERP amount in Euros. In conclusion, it can also be proved that the regions, regional convergence and regional development are now seen as essential for the EU and its political actors.

Subject	1988-1992	1993-1999	2000-2006	2007-2013
Agriculture and its development	58,1	48,2	46,1	39,5
European regional policy	21,7	33,3	33,0	33,6
Internal policies, including a.o. - Policy: competitiveness for growth	3,8	6,0	6,8	14,8 13,0
External Policies	5,1	6,9	8,8	9,3
Administration	9,3	4,8	5,2	2,8
Sum	100	100	100	100

Table 3 EU Budget by subject, in %, annual averages¹⁸²

4.2 Regional Policy

Europe's political actors, on all levels, have realised that the overall wealth and freedom also depends on regional convergence and regional economic wealth. Promoting overall economic wealth has been accounted as one of the most important goals.¹⁸³ Therefore, the consideration of the regional policy as well as the NRF of Denmark will be continued in this chapter.

4.2.1 European Regional Policy

According to the framework of ERP, money from the different funds is only given to regional strategies and measures on the NUTS 2 Level coordinated by the MSs. However, the grants are not given directly to the regions but to the national states for its NRP. Nevertheless, the very important principle of partnership, to which only regions can apply, helps the regions playing an important role in developing and implementing MSs' RP.¹⁸⁴


¹⁸⁰ Schmitt, in Klemmer (ed.), Handbuch Europäische Wirtschaftspolitik, p. 208 / Berg / Schmidt, in Klemmer (ed.), Handbuch Europäische Wirtschaftspolitik, pp. 925-927.

¹⁸¹ Brasche 2008, p. 225.

¹⁸² Brasche 2008, p. 245.

¹⁸³ Protocol Nr. 28 on Economic, Social and Territorial Cohesion.


¹⁸⁴ Tondl 2004, p. 19.



Graphic 5 GDP p.c. in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS)¹⁸⁵

Furthermore, most of the funds are designed for poor regions whereas Denmark’s GDP p.c. has always been above the EU27 average, as Graphic 5 shows. The GDP p.c. of the Danish regions differs on a very low level. Graphic 6 shows that only Sjælland and Hovedstaden are deviant to the rest.

This effect is a result of Sjælland being the island encircling Hovedstaden which actually is the region of Copenhagen and its surroundings. In other words, a high amount of citizens of Sjælland work in Hovedstaden and add an important part to the GDP in this region. This statistical effect arises because they are not citizens of Copenhagen. It is to be assumed that both regions equalise each other and are in line with the remaining three.



Graphic 6 GDP p.c. of Danish regions 1993 - 2008¹⁸⁶

Therefore, the possibility of grants for Danish regions looks small. In fact, Denmark received around 1.8% of all EU-grants in 2007. Compared to other MSs, this is one of the smallest percentages.¹⁸⁷ By enlarging the EU with poorer states, including their poor regions, it is getting more and more unlikely that Danish regions, with their current wealth and standard, will be able to apply for more ERP-grants.

¹⁸⁵ Eurostat, GDP p.c. in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) (EU27=100), April 2010, available at <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/graph.do?tab=graph&plugin=1&pcode=tsieb010&language=en&toolbox=close> (12 April 2010).

¹⁸⁶ Eurostat, RNAT11: GDP (DKK mio.) and GDP p.c. (DKK 1000) by region, type and price unit, May 2010, available at <http://www.statistikbanken.dk/statbank5a/default.asp?w=1024> (15 May 2010).

¹⁸⁷ Eurostat, Eurostat – list of grants awarded in 2007, May 2007, available at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/product_details/publication?p_product_code=GRANTS2008 (16 May 2010).

4.2.2 Danish National Strategic Reference Framework

In the preparation of the ERP each country has to hand in an NSRF. It is the base for granting the MSs aids from the funds. The current community contribution for Denmark is shown in Table 4. Denmark, however, does not point aids to specific region but to specific projects. By Danish law, whenever decisions have to be made about funds and aids (both national and European), the Danish regions and local authorities are highly involved in the decision making process about the project the money is to be spend on. The Danish Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs mainly carries out coordinating tasks. According to this law, regions and local authorities are also obligated to contribute money from their own financial resources.¹⁸⁸

Regional Competitiveness and Employment	Community contribution
Innovation and Knowledge (ERDF)	254.788.620 €
More and Better Jobs (ESF)	254.788.619 €
Total all funds NSRF 2007-2013	509.577.239 €

Table 4 Denmark's NSRF Financial Table¹⁸⁹

Taking the guaranteed financial autonomy, which was mentioned before, into account, the sub-national units are extremely empowered and integrated in the distribution of funds by the Danish legislation. As the money is appointed less by regions but by projects, it is very hard to give a detailed consideration on the regions.

4.3 Summary

The Regional Policy in Denmark rather has an integration effect than unfair distribution. By including regions and municipals into the decision-making process of granting funds, they become even more integrated than excluded. The principle of partnership is strongly applied in Denmark. Considering that the economic statistics show Denmark as an economically quite homogenous and integrated area, economic reasons for separatist movements seems to be hardly imaginable.

5. Denmark

As this master thesis analyses the Kingdom of Denmark, it is useful and indispensable to have an overview of the state organisation, history and general information about it. The Danish nation state excluding the autonomous regions of the KOD will be considered. Greenland and the Faroe Islands will be discussed below.

5.1 Facts and Historical Aspects

The KOD is the oldest state in the world. It exists since the 6th century. Denmark is named by the people called "Daner", which is a notion in the old Germanic languages for people who live in a flat area. A "Mark" means "March" which is a specific territory close to a border between two countries.¹⁹⁰ It has not always been such a small country, but a great power. Historical examples for this are the power, discoveries and occupations of the Vikings, the Kalmar Union – unifying Sweden, Norway, parts of Finland and Iceland under the Danish Crown – in the 14th century or the territorial annexation of Holstein and Oldenburg – parts of

¹⁸⁸ *Erhvervs- og Byggestyrelsen*, Regional konkurrenceevne og beskæftigelse i Danmark 2007-2013 – Danmarks strategiske referenceramme, Nov. 2006, pag. 88, available at http://www.ebst.dk/file/5468/Strategisk_referenceramme.pdf (16 May 2010).

¹⁸⁹ *European Commission*, Denmark – Cohesion Policy 2007-2013, Aug. 2009, pag. 2, available at http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/atlas2007/fiche/dk_en.pdf (16 May 2010).

¹⁹⁰ *Gyldendals Tibinds Leksikon* 1977, tome 2, p. 308.

the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation – in the 17th century. The Danish constitution exists since 1665 and that makes it one of the first in the world. In the 19th century, Denmark lost a lot of its territory (among others Norway, South of Schleswig or Holstein). Finally Iceland declared its independency in 1944.¹⁹¹

5.2 Its political system

Denmark is a constitutional monarchy – literately; “limited monarchy”.¹⁹² The King or Queen of Denmark has limited powers and rights and is less integrated in the day-to-day political process.¹⁹³ The Danish parliament is called “Folketing” and is a unicameral system, consisting of maximum 179 members, two the Faroe Islands and two from Greenland.¹⁹⁴ “Ting” is a representative assembly which takes care about public matters and “Folke” means “of the people”.¹⁹⁵ All Scandinavian countries – Denmark is not an exception – use the policy-making process based of consensus to include the opposition into the process of governing. Changes of governments happen quite often in Denmark. To reduce instability of parliament, each government cannot have a majority against itself in parliament which is called a negative parliamentarianism.¹⁹⁶ Elections on state, regional or local level are held every 4 years. However, the government can resign and / or arrange new elections before that period of time.¹⁹⁷ The parliament is successful in forcing the government out of office by a motion of no confidence.¹⁹⁸

Denmark is structured in three administrative levels: the national state, five regions and a total of 98 municipals. The most powerful level is the centralistic national state. The administrative power about health care, the subject area of education in social and special matters and the regional development lay on the regional level. Regional development mainly includes the cooperation and coordination between the municipal development and environmental programs.¹⁹⁹ The Danish regions are more confraternities of municipals for cost reasons than a powerful level in the decision making process. They very much depend on the municipal administration.²⁰⁰ However, the five regions are representing the NUTS Level 2 for Denmark. NUTS Level 0²⁰¹ and Level 1²⁰² are the same and include the whole country.

The municipals are much more powerful than the regions; they are responsible for all matters which are not explicitly reserved for the regional or national level. Each municipal has a quite

¹⁹¹ Gruner / Woyke 2004, pp. 79-80.

¹⁹² Kimmel 1996, p.38, Art. 2 / Loughlin 1999, p. 52.

¹⁹³ Jahn, in Jahn / Werz (eds.), Politische Systeme und Beziehungen im Ostseeraum, pp. 50-51 / cf. Kimmel 1996, pp. 39-41.

¹⁹⁴ Kimmel 1996, p. 42, Art. 28 / EU, Europa – European countries, Mai 2010, para. 4, available at http://europa.eu/abc/european_countries/eu_members/denmark/index_en.htm (10 Mai 2010).

¹⁹⁵ Gyldendals Tibinds Leksikon 1977, tome 3, p. 346.

¹⁹⁶ Loughlin 1999, p. 55.

¹⁹⁷ Christiansen / Rerup, Dänemark – Staat und Öffentlichkeit – Das politische System, Oct 1998, para. 6, available at <http://www.um.dk/Publikationer/UM/Deutsch/Daenemark/enzyklopaedie/kap1/1-10.asp> (11 Mai 2010).

¹⁹⁸ Danish Embassy Wien, Das Politische System in Dänemark – Das Folketing, April 2010, para. 3, available at <http://www.ambwien.um.dk/de/menu/Daenemark/Das+politische+System/> (11 Mai 2010).

¹⁹⁹ Danske Regioner, Regionerne – Kort fortalt, March 2008, pp. 11-12, available at <http://www.regioner.dk/Om%20Regionerne/~media/migration%20folder/upload/publikationer/regionerne/kort%20fortalt%20-%20rev%20%202008b.pdf.ashx> (19 May 2010).

²⁰⁰ Saller 1999, p. 27.

²⁰¹ Eurostat, Overview map of EU Countries – Country Level, 2008, available at <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ramon/nuts/pngmaps/eu0.png> (3 Mai 2010).

²⁰² Eurostat, Overview map of EU Countries – NUTS Level 1, 2008, available at <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ramon/nuts/pngmaps/eu1.png> (3 Mai 2010).

powerful mayor who is not just responsible for all political actions of the local government, but also for all administrative ones. The position of the Danish mayors is unique, not only in Europe but also in Scandinavia.²⁰³

5.3 Denmark and the EU

In 1973 Denmark joined the, at that time called, EC as a result of a referendum in the year before. Joining and creating the EU was problematic for the Danes. Their popular vote of rejection resulted in a serious problem to put the Maastricht Treaty into force. To push the European integration forward, there have been several ideas such as excluding Denmark from the EU (including the EC), or that all other MSs will leave the community and create a new one. Both ideas would have led to a schism of Europe and were not acceptable.²⁰⁴ The solution was the Edinburgh Compromise which gave Denmark opt-outs in four different areas that were considered as most fundamental by the Danish population: 1) Third phase of the EMU, 2) Defence policy, 3) Union citizenship and 4) Cooperation on judicial and police issues. All these Danish exceptions are still valid for the Lisbon treaty and show a strong fear of losing sovereignty.²⁰⁵ Especially the exception of introducing the Euro, the third phase of the EMU, does not make any sense in an economic aspect. In general, the exchange rates are fixed to the Euro on $\pm 15\%$ ²⁰⁶. In the case of the DKK it is, for historical reasons, fixed on $\pm 2.25\%$ ²⁰⁷. The idea was to be prepared and stable enough to entirely introduce the new common currency. As soon as the pegging is done, the national central bank is no longer allowed to adjust its currency according to the economic situation what than might lead to even more economic problems for the country.²⁰⁸

Regarding the opt-out of the Union citizenship, it has to be clear that the first Danish realisation of the Maastricht Treaty mentioned a Union nationality which gives the impression to substitute the national citizenship. The Danes were at one with not giving up their Danish nationality for a Union one, if this is the case in the future. Basically, this opt-out is of little importance but it clearly shows the strong connection between the Danes and their nation.²⁰⁹

5.4 Denmark's identity

Since its large losses of territory and power, Denmark is a small and homogenous nation state with a special development in the cultural, social and democratic fields which strengthened the Danish society. Especially the political effort since the industrialisation, to promote a social society with no economic imbalance and high solidarity, helped increasing the Danish national feeling and strengthening their nation.²¹⁰ Over time and until today, this country – as all Scandinavian countries – is characterized by its high ethnic homogeneity.²¹¹ The strong national feeling can be seen everywhere and is deeply rooted in Danish society. It is reflected in one of the typical Danish traditions: Flagging. Flagging the Dannebrog, which is the name of the Danish flag and means literally translated “cloth of the Danes”,²¹² is always possible, especially if someone celebrates his birthday. Among others, it is used for decorating cakes

²⁰³ Loughlin 1999, p. 56.

²⁰⁴ Waltemathe 2000, p. 25.

²⁰⁵ Bonde / Krarup 1997, pp. 94-98.

²⁰⁶ Raidt 2008, p. 43.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid* 2008, p. 41.

²⁰⁸ Filáček / Horváth / Škořepa, in: Rusek / Lacina / Fidrmuc (eds.), *The Economic Performance of the European Union*, p. 161 / Rostaing-Paris, in: Ferreiro, Fontana, Serrano (eds.), *Fiscal Policy in the European Union*, p. 34.


²⁰⁹ Bonde / Krarup 1997, p. 96.

²¹⁰ Lyketoft 2009, p. 3.

²¹¹ Loughlin 1999, p. 52-53.

²¹² *Gyldendals Tibinds Leksikon* 1977, tome 2, p. 319.

and clothes and represents the strong connection between the people and its nation. However, it is very important for each Dane not to associate this with a national socialist feeling but with pride to be Danish.²¹³



Graphic 7 Survey on feeling of identity among Danes in %²¹⁴

Comparing the results of the survey in Graphic 3 and 7, the Danes are way below the EU average to consider themselves as European. Graphic 7 shows that there is a very high level of only feeling Danish. Such a high level of non-competing and even non-additional identities, taking only the European and the national ones into account, seems to show a very low possibility of separatism but a strong homogenous national identity.

5.5 Specific Danish regions

This part compares some Danish regions which might create their own national feeling on different grounds instead of sharing the strong Danish national identity.

5.5.1 Culture: Sønderjylland – the German minority

For historical reasons, a German minority is based in the southern part of the Danish mainland, Jylland, and a Danish minority is based in the northern part of the German federal state of Schleswig-Holstein.²¹⁵ On both sides of the border these minorities are officially recognised and have obtained specific powers and rights, especially in cultural issues. In Denmark, German is recognised as a minority language as well as Danish is in Germany.²¹⁶

Both national minorities changed over time into cross border nationals, bearing both nationalities – the Danish and the German. They consider themselves as bridge-builders between the nations and do, in Denmark at least, not have any separatist intentions, not least due to the strong assimilation of Danish and German speaking groups in that area and their high level of integration.²¹⁷

²¹³ Sebro / Skov Larsen 2002, pp. 519-522.

²¹⁴ Kaina 2009, p. 61.

²¹⁵ Pedersen in; Institut for Grænseregionsforskning, Grænseregionsforskning 1976-2001 – Sprog og identitet i grænseregionen, pp. 223-224.

²¹⁶ European Commission, Education and Training - the Euromosaic study, available at http://ec.europa.eu/education/languages/archive/languages/langmin/euromosaic/de1_en.html and http://ec.europa.eu/education/languages/archive/languages/langmin/euromosaic/da1_en.html (8 April 2010).

²¹⁷ Prime Minister Schleswig-Holstein (ed.) 2009, pp. 69-70 / Thaler 2009, p. 158.

Having that point in mind, the German minority can be considered as an ethnic group inside the KOD as they are interested in being integrated in the Danish state but preserve their German culture and language.

5.5.2 Territory, Size, History: Bornholm

Bornholm is an island located in the south-eastern part of the Baltic Sea. The distance to Sweden is about 37 km. It belongs to Denmark and forms a municipality on its own, integrated in the Hovedstaden-region, with a total of 42.154 habitants²¹⁸. Its capital is the city of Rønne. The spoken language on the island is Danish, but even the townsfolk speak it with a Swedish accent although they do not speak Swedish. Bornholm's habitants are proud of being Danish and consider themselves as Danes.²¹⁹

It is comparable with the Faroe Islands regarding being an island of similar populace size and geographically separated from Denmark. But there is an essential difference as far as this geographical aspect is concerned: Bornholm is not as afield as the Faroes and lies in the middle of the Baltic Sea.

For a short time in the 10th century, Bornholm has been a Kingdom on its own.²²⁰ Compared with the time being Danish, even when Denmark lost South Sweden and other territory in the Baltic area, this short period did not raise any national feeling among the islanders that can be compared to the Danish one.²²¹

5.5.3 Economic: Øresund-Region

Øresund is the channel between the Danish island Sjælland and the South-Swedish region Scania.²²² Regionally speaking, it includes all municipals which have a coast towards the shipping channel. It is considered as a conurbation of European importance²²³ and includes the cities of Copenhagen, Malmoe, Elsinore and Helsingborg. The number of habitants is about 3.6 million Danish and Swedish citizens.²²⁴

This region already received several millions from the EU by the TEN-T programme to promote the economical integration and growth between Scandinavia and Central Europe. Just recently the COM approved about 339 million Euros for the period between 2007 and 2013 for the new bridge across the Fehmarn-Belt between Germany and the Danish regions Sjælland.²²⁵ The first bridge already increased the economic wealth of the Øresund -region and, to a certain extent, a common identity arose.²²⁶ However, to call this identity strong enough to be even mentioned as a regional one would lead too far. Separatist movements in this area are not to be expected, especially because the political and cultural core of Denmark, namely its capital Copenhagen, is part of this region.

²¹⁸ Danmarks Statistik, Folketal 1 (Februar 2010), available at <http://www.statistikbanken.dk/statbank5a/default.asp?w=1024> (8 April 2010).

²¹⁹ Bornholms Regionskommune, Om Regionskommune, 29th of December 2009, available at <http://www.brk.dk/BRK/site.aspx?p=14821> (20 April 2010).

²²⁰ Sawyer, in Olsen (ed.), Danmarkshistorie, tome 3, pp. 88-89.

²²¹ Skovgaard-Petersen, in Helle (ed.), The Cambridge history of Scandinavia, pp. 169-171.

²²² Gyldendals Tibinds Leksikon 1977, Tome 10, p. 343.

²²³ Saller 1999, pp. 66-67.

²²⁴ Øresunddirekt, What is the Øresundregion?, 2005, available at http://www.oresundsregionen.org/About.aspx?sc_lang=en (15 April 2010).

²²⁵ Please see Femerns A/S, Financing, August 2009, available at <http://www.femern.com/Home/Project/What+are+the+costs%3f/Financing> (18 May 2010).

²²⁶ Øresundsbro Konsortiet, Facts and Figures, January 2009, first survey graph, available at <http://uk.oresundsbron.com/page/371> (18 May 2010).

5.6 Conclusion

Denmark is a homogenous and intra-integrated modern state. Regions and local authorities are highly integrated into the policy-making process on national and even European level. Even the ethnic minority feels integrated and is proud to be Danish but also German. Separatist movement, due to territorial, economic or ethnical reasons, seems to be unthinkable. European regionalism, and its empowerment of the regions, supports integration and not separatism in Denmark. Separatism only appears and depends on the nation and its feeling of identity which is influenced by e.g. economic, ethnic or territorial reasons.

6. Autonomous Regions of the Danish realm

There are two autonomous regions in the northern hemisphere which belong to the KOD. Both are not directly part of the EU. For a better understanding of the research question it is important to have some information on these regions.

6.1 Faroe Islands

The notion of Faroe originates from the old-Icelandic word “Færejar” and turned into the modern Faroe term “Føroyar”. “Fær-“ (“Før-”) means sheep and “-eyjar” (“-oyar”) signifies islands. Due to the fact that the islands have been densely populated by Soay -sheep, probably brought by former eremites, at the time when the first proper settlers arrived, this archipelago is bestowed its title upon these sheep.²²⁷ From an historical point of view, the islands were very international, being part of Norway, Sweden or Denmark or being occupied by Great Britain during World War II.²²⁸ On the Faroese territory of 1399 km² live 48.631 people.²²⁹ Economically speaking, the Faroese government is in good shape: it had more income than expenditures in the last 20 years.²³⁰

6.1.1 Political system

The islands have a unicameral political system with the parliament – “Løgtingið” – of 32 representatives, elected for a period of 4 years²³¹. “Løgtingið” means “representative assembly for legal matters”.²³² All citizens older than 18 years are allowed to vote.²³³ The current prime minister is Kay Leo Johannesen and was, as well as his 8 ministers, inaugurated in September 2008.²³⁴ Each minister needs to be accepted by a minimum of 17 members of the Løgtingið. If 17 members of the Løgtingið are against one of the current ministers, all of them have to re-

²²⁷ West 1974, pp.14-15.

²²⁸ Gruner / Woyke 2004, p. 86.

²²⁹ Hagstova Føroya (=Statistics Faroe Islands), Changes in population by Islands, year, month and immi- and emigration, 18th of March 2010, available at

http://www.hagstova.fo/portal/page/portal/HAGSTOVAN/Statistics_%20Faroe_Islands/Statistics/Population%20and%20elections/Talva%20BRBGDMD_09_EN (20 March 2010).

²³⁰ Hagstova Føroya, Faroe Islands in figures 2009, June 2009, p. 37, available at

http://www.hagstova.fo/portal/page/portal/HAGSTOVAN/Statistics_%20Faroe_Islands/Publications/FAROE_ISL_IN_FIG_2004/FAR_FIG/Faroe%20Islands%20in%20figures%202009.pdf (19 May 2010).

²³¹ Løgtingið (=the Faeroese parliament), The Faroese Parliament, January 2009, p. 8, available at

http://www.logting.fo/files/File/2008/faldari_EN_web.pdf (18 May 2010).

²³² Gyldendals Tibinds Leksikon 1977, tome 6, p. 45.

²³³ Løgtingið (=the Faeroese parliament), The Faroese Parliament, January 2009, p. 8, available at

http://www.logting.fo/files/File/2008/faldari_EN_web.pdf (18 May 2010).

²³⁴ Prime Minister´s Office, Government, September 2008, available at

<http://www.tinganes.fo/Default.aspx?ID=6506> (19 May 2010).

sign.²³⁵ The Faroese authorities have rights on the legislation and administration of the Faroe Islands. In the Home Rule Act and the Takeover Act all fields which can be taken over are mentioned. Field, which are not taken over yet, remain in the responsibility of the Danish authorities.²³⁶ The Danish government is represented by the Danish High Commissioner. He is the connecting link between the Faroese authorities and Denmark. Laws which passed the Folketing and affect Faroese affairs need to be reviewed by the Løgtingið as well as signed by the Faroese prime minister, thus the same way as Faroese laws. The results are non-binding recommendations which are handed over to the Danish government which usually changes the law accordingly to it. Afterwards it can be transformed into Faroese legislation.²³⁷

6.1.2 Relation to the EU

The Faroe Islands received their status of autonomy long before Denmark joined the EU. Regarding the foreign policy, Denmark still has the exclusive competence, even for the Faroese territory. In general, there is no own Faroese foreign policy. The government of Denmark has to work closely with the Faroese one, treating them as an equal partner in such issues. They have to ratify every single international treaty as well to come into force in their territory.²³⁸ However, due to the high importance of the fishery industry, the Faroe Islands never ratified the EU-treaties.²³⁹ As seen in the chapter 3, the Faroese are, according to EU primary law, not part of the EU.

Several years ago, the Faroe Islands concluded an agreement with the former EC to guarantee free trade and its embracing sustainable growth.²⁴⁰ The current version of this agreement is valid since January 1st, 1997, and includes all issues about the rights and rules on free trade between the Islands and the EU. Its protocols and annexes are an integral part of the agreement and also valid.²⁴¹ In general, one has to say that this agreement brings the Faroe Islands, in term of their status to the EU, on almost the same level as Greenland.

6.1.3 Linguistic aspects

The main language is Faroese. Danish has to be used in public affairs, taught, and all Faroese documents need to be accompanied by Danish translations at the presentation of cases of appeal.²⁴² Faroese identity can be elucidated by its language history, considering that, since their belonging to the Crown of Denmark, it has been tried to enforce the Danish language on the Faroe Islands. Especially because it is much closer to Norwegian and Icelandic than to Danish, the former Danish government did not want to strengthen the Faroese nationalist movement

²³⁵ Løgtingið (=the Faroese parliament), The Faroese Parliament, January 2009, p. 15, available at http://www.logting.fo/files/File/2008/faldari_EN_web.pdf (18 May 2010).

²³⁶ Statsministeriet, The Faeroes Islands Self-Government Arrangement, passages 11 and 12, available at http://www.stm.dk/a_2956.html (19 May 2010).

²³⁷ Løgtingið (=the Faroese parliament), The Faroese Parliament, January 2009, p. 14, available at http://www.logting.fo/files/File/2008/faldari_EN_web.pdf (18 May 2010).

²³⁸ Statsministeriet, The Faeroes Islands Self-Government Arrangement, under the heading "Foreign Policy Matters", available at http://www.stm.dk/a_2956.html (14 May 2010).

²³⁹ Gruner / Woyke 2004, p. 86.

²⁴⁰ *Official Journal of the EU (1997)*, Agreement of the 6th December 1996 between the European Community, of the one part, and the Government of Denmark and the Home Government of the Faroe Islands, of the other part, Art. 1, OJ 1997 L53, p. 3.

²⁴¹ *Official Journal of the EU (1997)*, Agreement of the 6th December 1996 between the European Community, of the one part, and the Government of Denmark and the Home Government of the Faroe Islands, of the other part, Art. 37, OJ 1997 L53, p.7.

²⁴² Prime Ministers Office, Act on the Home Government of the Faeroes, 31st March 1948, Section 12, available at <http://www.tinganes.fo/Default.aspx?ID=201> (20 March 2010).

by allowing a language which they could not understand.²⁴³ Since the beginning of the 20th century, the will of reinforcement of the national language bore fruits to the islands and it had been introduced first as subject to be taught. Later on, it became the official language used for teaching. Nowadays, it is the official language while Danish is just the second. Faroese represents the smallest of the modern Germanic languages and is one of the smallest in Europe.²⁴⁴

6.1.4 Faroese Identity

Since the end of the 19th century, a nationalist movement arose among the Faroese. It first started with a group of students in Copenhagen but quickly moved back to Tórshavn – the capital of the Faroe Islands. The mentioned national feeling increased and resulted in the creation of the Sjárvstýrisflokkur – a political party desiring autonomy. Thanks to the British occupation during World War II and the disconnection to the German-occupied Denmark, the political national feeling could gain importance. After World War II, the Faroese parliament arranged a referendum which resulted in a proclaimed Faroese sovereignty and independence from the KOD by the islands' government. Denmark answered with holding new elections for the Løgtingið. Their results changed the distribution of power and the independence had been revoked, but a certain autonomy inside the realm had been achieved.²⁴⁵ The national identity is reflected not at least by its long history on an afield territory. It made the creation of an own language, own tradition and own culture possible and made, several centuries ago, the creation of certain regional governments necessary. This established not only a national identity, but also a political one. It seeks its protection and development not only in home- ruling, but also in the current discussion of the Faroese constitution including its empowerment of the Faroese nation, language and symbols.²⁴⁶

6.2 Greenland

The name “Greenland” has been given by Erik the Red when he discovered and seized the island.²⁴⁷ On the territory of 2.175.600km²²⁴⁸ are living 56.194 people²⁴⁹. The main languages are Greenlandic and Danish, but the first is mostly used in school and among the population.²⁵⁰ Discovered by the Vikings in the 10th century, been initial point for expeditions towards America – several centuries before the time of Columbus – and almost abandoned by Scandinavians, are just some unique historical points. Until the 15th century, Greenland was under Norwegian legislation. From the 18th century onwards, Denmark ruled it first as being a Danish colony, later being part of the nation state and since 1979 being an autonomous region. All tries to either incorporate or separate it from Denmark, did not work out. During World

²⁴³ Hutterer 1975, pp. 158.

²⁴⁴ Wessén 1968, p. 55.

²⁴⁵ *Gyldendals Tibends Leksikon* 1977, tome 4, p. 19.

²⁴⁶ *Prime Minister's Office, Færøernes Forfatning – Betænkning – Oversættelse ved Rigsombudsmanden på Færøerne (=Faeroes Constitution – Approval Certificate – Translation of the Ombudsman of the Empire on the Faeroes)*, Dec. 2006, pp. 45-48, available at http://www.tinganes.fo/Admin/Public/DWSDownload.aspx?File=%2FFiles%2FFiler%2Fpdf++frgreiingar++froyiskum%2FOversættelse_Faeroernes_forfatning_Betaenkning.pdf (19 May 2010).

²⁴⁷ Gøbel in; *Nordstrom (ed.)*, Dictionary of Scandinavian History, p. 233.

²⁴⁸ Mathiasen, Om Grønland, April 2010, available at <http://dk.nanoq.gl/Emner/Om%20Groenland.aspx> (3 Mai 2010).

²⁴⁹ Kalaallit Nunaanni Naatsorsueqqissaartarfik (=Statistic Greenland), Oversigt 1. Befolkningen pr. 1. januar fordelt på fødested, 2001 – 2009, available at <http://www.stat.gl/LinkClick.aspx?link=BefolkStat%2fBev%e2%80%98gelsler%2fGr%c3%b8nlands+befolkning+pr.+1.+jaunuar+2009.xls&tabid=86&mid=457&language=da-DK> (20 March 2010).

²⁵⁰ Mathiasen, Om Grønland, April 2010, available at <http://dk.nanoq.gl/Emner/Om%20Groenland.aspx> (3 Mai 2010).

War II, Greenland, different to the Faroe Islands, had been under the protectorate of the USA until 1951.²⁵¹

6.2.1 Political system

Greenland is a unicameral, dependend democracy inside the realm. Its parliament is called “Landstinget” or “Inatsisartut”, the parliamentarian assembly of a state inside the realm, and has 31 representatives who are elected for four years. The prime minister, since 2009 Mr. Kuupik Kleist, is elected by the Inatsisartut which appoints the ministers.²⁵² The current cabinet consists of eight ministers and the prime minister, five men and four women.²⁵³ Similar to the Faroese system, the parliament has the legislation and administration powers on Greenland’s territory and works closely with its government, which consist of the ministers plus the prime minister and is called “Naalakkersuisut”, in the policy-making process. The Inatsisartut has full competence on Greenland’s financial issues.²⁵⁴ Since 1979, Greenland has its status of autonomy. Since 2009, it is possible for the Greenlandic authorities to take over more responsibility and policy fields, and to appoint Greenlandic as the official language of Greenland.²⁵⁵ All this makes the Greenlandic political system and its status of autonomy very similar to the Faroese.²⁵⁶

6.2.2 Relation to the EU

When Denmark joined the EEC in the 1970’s, Greenland was still an integrated part of the KOD and became part of the EEC. By being granted the status of autonomy in 1978, Greenland was facing some dichotomy of interests: Firstly, it wanted lower prices for groceries than there were on the common market and secondly, Greenland wanted more control on their almost single source of income, the fishery resources. It was threatened by other European fishermen. Even the EEC granted, via Copenhagen, around 84 million DKK to Greenland. But it only represented about 8% of all Danish grants and hence, it was negligible.²⁵⁷ After a narrow referendum in 1982, Greenland’s citizens decided to leave the EEC. Some treaty amendments and negotiations with the COM took place. In 1985, Greenland finally withdrew from the EC and became one of the overseas countries and territories.²⁵⁸ Calling this a real withdrawal would not be correct. Greenland has never been a MS on its own. More correct would be the notion of an agreement of changing the territorial scope of the EC. The geographical situation, the one-sided straightened economy and the small size of Greenland’s population were reasons to make this “withdrawal” happen.²⁵⁹

6.2.3 Linguistic aspects

Greenlandic is an Eskimo language and, unlike Faroese, a non-indo-Germanic language. It can be separated into three dialects: Polar Eskimo, West- and East- Greenlandic. The language always was used by the people. The first books had been printed in 1850 already and

²⁵¹ Gruner / Woyke 2004, p. 87.

²⁵² *Ibid* 2004, p. 88.

²⁵³ *Grønlands Selvstyre*, Medlemmer af Naalakkersuisut, March 2010, available at <http://dk.nanoq.gl/Emner/Landsstyre/Medlemmer.aspx> (19 May 2010).

²⁵⁴ *Inatsisartut*, Lovgivningskompetencen, available at <http://www.landstinget.gl/inatsisartuthome/om-inatsisartut/lovgivningsprocessen?lang=da> (19 May 2010).

²⁵⁵ *Inatsisartut*, Selvstyreloven, June 2009, Kapitel 2 and 7, available at <http://www.landstinget.gl/inatsisartuthome/selvstyreloven> (19 May 2010).

²⁵⁶ *Sørensen* 2006, p. 135.

²⁵⁷ *Sørensen* 2007, p. 167.

²⁵⁸ Gruner / Woyke 2004, pp. 88-89.


²⁵⁹ *Waltmathe* 2000, pp. 26-28.

soon the first Greenlandic newspaper was published. Today, TV programs and radio stations broadcast in Greenlandic. There are two daily bilingual – Danish and Greenlandic – newspapers available. Greenlandic is mainly used in the public and political sphere of Greenland. All laws and official documents need to be translated into Danish as well.²⁶⁰

6.2.4 Identity

There are several ideas of describing the Greenlandic identity; additional, totally different and competing and almost different and competing to the Danish one. All in all, there is no doubt a Greenlandic identity exists. Due to the fact that the Greenlanders are the native people of Greenland and, according to latest research, descend not from European but Inuit ancestors²⁶¹, it is, as well as its language, internationally recognised by politicians.²⁶² Language policy always was ground for intense debates in the Greenlandic parliament – even before the home rule. Nowadays, this kind of discussions is reduced but still appears – especially if it is about an important issue regarding identity.²⁶³

One reason of Greenlandic culture and language protection, as well as nationalist and separatist movements, is shown in Graphic 8. The notion of Greenlanders and Danes is ethnically not clear-cut in this statistic. The main criterion for the statistics, since 1950, is the place of birth: either in Greenland or outside. An approximation to the ethnical reality, however, seems to be given.²⁶⁴ According to newspaper articles, latest results show that ancestors of the Inuit originate from Asia and arrived via Alaska to northwest of Greenland around 1000 years ago, around the same time as the Vikings.²⁶⁵ In any case it shows, that the Greenlandic identity is much more related to the origin, culture, language and traditions, which are different to the Danish or European ones.



Graphic 8 Greenlanders and Danes in Greenland 1970-2000²⁶⁶

6.3 Trends

Concluding, in both autonomous regions the trend towards total independence is recognized and permitted by the Danish government and its legislation. The rest of Denmark is not showing any ambitions towards separatism. The autonomy of Greenland and the Faroe Islands is even recognized by the EU. Their partial integration is achieved via primary or secondary law.

²⁶⁰ Berge, in Brown / Ogilvie (eds.), Concise Encyclopaedia of Languages of the World, pp. 1174-1175.

²⁶¹ Sørensen 2007, p. 11.

²⁶² Gad 2005, pp. 84-87.

²⁶³ Gad 2005, pp. 230-231.

²⁶⁴ Sørensen 2007, p. 152.

²⁶⁵ Ejsing, Grønlænder-magnet fra rummet, 2nd March 2010, Berlingske Tidende.

²⁶⁶ Sørensen 2007, p. 152.

Some voices which admit Greenland and the Faroe Islands in the EU come from Canada, having several problems with overfishing by the vessels of the autonomous regions.²⁶⁷ The Faroe Islands already prepared a constitution and are in talks with Denmark about separation. Its end will be depending on a referendum on the Faroe Islands. Greenland, in contrast, has a currently new relationship to Denmark: self-governance. Even at the previous discussions on the creation of the Greenlandic Home Rule Act, it was never the idea of being totally separated from the realm. Greenland still has internal problems arising from the colonial period such as unemployment, infrastructure and alcoholism. In addition to all this, its debts are quite high and the Danish government grant a lot of aids. Considering all this, a sooner separation from the realm seems not to be intended by the Greenlanders.²⁶⁸ Regarding the integration into the EU one has to say that they are economically heavily integrated. The question in how far Greenland or the Faroe Islands want to be integrated in the future is not as easy to answer. Reasons to join the EU are of economic, power or security nature and values are neither unimportant.²⁶⁹ From the autonomous region's point of view, the only possibility to join the EU would be as a proper MS. Being recognized by all EU-MSs would increase their sovereignty a lot. Considering the controversial interests on fishing policy, the small size of the markets and the efforts needed for the amendment process, this might not happen in the foreseen future.

7. Final remarks

The master thesis' aim of research was to answer if European regionalism leads to separatism. By explaining the relevant notions of separatism, regions, regionalism and Europeanism it has been elaborated that a nation's feeling of identity, a region or an ethnical group influenced by several other factors – such as economical or territorial aspects – is essential for this examination. Europe's political actors – the EU, the COE, their MSs, etc. – strengthen and recognise the position of the regions and minorities in the political and economic stage. The Danish national legal acts, the principle of subsidiarity, the European Charter of Regional Self-Government and the provisions in the UN- Charter are just some examples. Integration seems to be the leading reason for the legal aspect. According to this, regions shall gain certain autonomy inside the national and European political system to improve efficiency. Even by increasing the minority rights, e.g. of ethnic groups, integration, not separatism, is promoted. A common and overall wealth in all regions is the goal of regional policy. This again supports integration and not separatism. Aims of separatists, like having a voice in the national system, certain autonomy and – economically and legally speaking – equality are given by European regionalism and its process of integration.

7.1 Conclusion

It is striking that supranational actors are trying to promote integration for all elements of society – minorities, ethnic groups, regions and nations. If separatist movements arise in a national state, the supranational actors leave this problem, first of all, between the separatists and the national state and, after finding a solution, recognise it. This has been done e.g. in the case of Greenland.

European regionalism, therefore, does not lead to separatism, but to integration. It supports the effort to balance the unequal wealth, all over Europe.

²⁶⁷ *Ritzau*, Færøerne vrede over havnelukning, 22nd February 2010, *Politiken/Ritzau*, Canada protests overfishing, Vol. 13, 18th February 2010, Copenhagen Post.

²⁶⁸ *Sørensen* 2007, p. 169 / *Gruner / Woyke* 2004, p. 88.

²⁶⁹ *Alsen* 2009, pp. 81-84.

7.2 Prevision

Denmark, being one nation inside the KOD, including its different regions, however, does not face any separatist movement. Its homogenous strong nation and overall welfare, its high integration of the local authorities in the national policy-making process, its size and its history are just some facts to prevent separatism in Denmark.

The KOD is facing separatism by Greenland and the Faroe Islands. Due to domestic problems, Greenland might not separate in the foreseen future. In this case, the current status of self-governance might remain in the long term. On the other hand, the Faroe Islands already prepared their own constitution and are in discussion with the realm regarding separation.

On the European level, separatism for integrated sub-national actors is improbable. Promoting European integration by balancing the regional economic wealth, involving sub-national actors in the policy-making process and granting minority rights, like the Charter of Regional and Minority Languages, helps increasing the corporate feeling or European identity and the cooperation and the respect between all political actors and promotes freedom.

7.3 Critical remarks

This paper dealt a lot with identity and feeling of identity. Surveys comparing the national and the European attitude on identity are included. However, the regional aspect is not included. A survey of such an issue should be made all over Europe. Problems like individual definitions of the term “region”, the size of the nation and the complexity of such a European wide project would arise and unfortunately reduces the informal value.

Even if the results would be the same, the secondary law has to be considered to provide a deeper examination.

Due to individual factors, the results of this paper are not per se conferrable to other regions which have to be considered on their own.

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