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European Union Training Mission Mali (EUTM Mali) as an Example of the European Union's Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management

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Jan-Uwe Pettke*

Abstract

After the French armed intervention in Mali, which main objective was to stop the advance of various Islamist terror groups approaching the Malian capitol of Bamako, the EU launched its unified effort of a military training mission in order to shape conditions for safeguarding achievements of the French operation Serval. The mission objective is to enable Malian Armed Forces to conduct military operations aiming at restoring Malian territorial integrity and reducing the threat posed by terrorist groups. This paper focuses on the measures of the EU to achieve these goals. In the current context it seems as if the effort of the EU has grave shortcomings with regard to the mission objectives. The current effort concentrates exclusively on military training, neglecting the need for comprehensive security sector reforms but also general institutional reforms and sustainable development concepts addressing the root causes of the conflict and addressing also the needs of the various Malian social communities. Hence, this paper will give remarks on adapting the EU's and its member states' efforts in the light of a common comprehensive approach for conflict resolution to restore Mali's territorial integrity but also on institutional reforms and development.

key words: EUTM, Mali, ECOWAS

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List of abbreviations

AFISMA	African-led International Support Mission to Mali
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AQIM	Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb
Art.	Article
AU	African Union
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EEAS	European External Action Service
EU	European Union
EUTM	European Union Training Mission
HR	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
IC	International Community
IED	Improved Explosive Device
MAF	Malian Armed Forces
MDSF	Malian Defence and Security Forces
MIA	Islamic Movement for the Azawad (M ouvement I slamique de l' A zawad)
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission Mali (<u>French</u> : M ission multidimensionnelle intégrée des N ations U nies pour la stabilisation au M ali)
MNLA	National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (<u>French</u> : M ouvement N ational de L ibération de l' A zawad)
MUJWA	Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
p.	page
para.	Paragraph
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TTP	Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
UN	United Nations

“The EU reiterates the need for a coherent and comprehensive approach to the crisis in Mali, in which Malian, regional and African ownership is essential.”¹

“Everyone understands that the future of the subregion and beyond depends on Mali’s stabilization and development”²

1. Introduction

1.1. Actuality and relevance

Even though the first announcement has been made prior to the French intervention in Mali which started on 11th January 2013 with airstrikes against Islamist groups approaching Bamako, it clearly states the political will and also the understanding for the need for a comprehensive conflict resolution in Mali. The second statement underlines the need for a conflict resolution also beyond the Malian borders within the Sahel region. The crises in Mali and its neighbouring countries of the Sahel region will not be solved by military intervention. The root causes are too complex and therefore they need complex solutions.³

A comprehensive approach for a comprehensive conflict resolution and transformation is crucial. France - a member state of the European Union - reacted with a military intervention on a conflict escalation which threatened the Malian capitol of Bamako and the entire southern Mali. But with this intervention and re-conquering of the northern provinces of Timbuktu, Kidal and Gao the French troops with support of Chadian armed forces and remaining Malian Armed Forces (MAF) changed the power balance in this region fundamentally. A French withdrawal without filling this power gap might have led to further deterioration of the security and humanitarian situation in these provinces. Hence immediate measures had to be taken in order to keep and build on the achievements of the French intervention. The European Union Training Mission Mali (EUTM Mali) is one of the first and immediate contributions to the needs for immediate and comprehensive conflict resolution.

¹ Council of the European Union: Press Release - Council conclusions on Mali, 3209th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, December 2012, p. 17, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/134152.pdf (16 February 2013).

² *Fabius*, in: *Nossiter*, Rebuilding of Mali Faces Daunting Obstacles, Despite Outside Aid, The New York Times, May 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/17/world/africa/rebuilding-of-mali-is-daunting-task-despite-aid.html?partner=rss&emc=rss&_r=2& (24 May 2013).

³ *Affa'a-Mindzie/Perry*, Mali and the Sahel-Sahara: From Crisis Management to Sustainable Strategy, International Peace Institute (IPI), February 2013, p. 1, available at http://www.ipinst.org/media/pdf/publications/ipi_e_pub_mali_and_sahel__2_.pdf (17 March 2013).

Due to the fact that EUTM Mali is such immediate response on request of the Malian transitional government with regard to the recent developments in Mali, shortcomings of its mandate, tasks and scope are not surprising. But in the course of time the EUTM Mali should adapt to the changing political environment and the increasing number of participants in the conflict resolution.

1.2. Thesis, scope of the study and proceeding

The focus of this study lies on the European Union's contributions to the resolution of the crisis in the Republic of Mali and the wider Sahel region taking into account the idea of a 'comprehensive approach' as theoretical and practical framework for modern conflict resolution.

This paper first defines a concept of a comprehensive approach in order to transfer the findings of these to the situation in Mali. In a second part, the findings will also be compared with the taken and planned measures of the European Union (EU) and its member states as well as the African Union (AU) and its member states and furthermore of the United Nations (UN) in order to assess whether these measures are included in a coordinated concept of a comprehensive approach among troop contributing and intervening countries as well as Mali itself as host-nation. In the final chapter the general theoretical assumption concerning a comprehensive approach will be compared with the current practical mission planning and also the already applied measures in order to develop a draft proposal of a roadmap to solve the most severe and most urgent problems of the conflict in Mali and also in the Sahel region. This study will only give general proposals due to the fact that each single aspect of the proposals would make additional and complex research in the respective field necessary. Furthermore it is intention of this study to display the operational and comprehensive needs in order to solve a conflict like the Malian one from an EU perspective. And despite the fact that this work will mainly focus on the measures and contributions to be taken by the EU and its member states, this study also has to take into consideration the measures and contributions of other organizations and single states, in order to draft a comprehensive concept for a potential conflict resolution.

In order to be able to display this general overview, in a first step it is necessary to avoid a too much specified view on single aspect of the conflict and its possible solutions. This would be part of a second research. Additionally the nature of the comprehensive approach is a very

broad one. Furthermore it would also afford additional complex research on national caveats and conflict resolution capacities of EU member states if a further deeper analysis of single measures for conflict resolution were the aim.

1.3. State of research and literature

Due to the fact that the current crisis in Mali is on the one hand a crisis reaching back to the independence of Mali in 1960 but on the other hand a fast developing crisis the situation of literature and the state of research are quite volatile.

There exist a quite broad literature on the general and historical root causes of the conflicts in Mali and the wider Sahel region. But with the intervention of EU and NATO in Libya in 2011, impacting on the situation in Mali, and the developments in Mali since summer 2012, the up-to-date literature becomes manageable. International think tanks dealing with EU and UN policies as well as think tanks dealing with African studies or general peace studies publicise recent studies and research papers on the evolving crisis in Mali and the Sahel. Furthermore this study applies UN, EU and also French official publications and press releases in order to monitor the development of various conflict resolution measures. In addition this study relies on publications of news agencies and other media companies in order to track the current political and military situation in the region.

Concerning the current state of research there exists conformity on the root causes of the various crises in Mali and beyond. And the majority of commentators also agree on the fact that an immediate and comprehensive crisis resolution is needed in order to preserve the positive gains of the French intervention in Mali. But all comments and studies are imprecise about the actors and the measure to be taken.

Due to the fact that the Malian crisis is an ongoing conflict without predictable outcome, the research of this paper ended on 12th June 2013. All later developments cannot be taken into consideration due to the obligation to submit this study not later than 14th June 2013.

2. General definition of a comprehensive approach

The term of comprehensive approach has various meanings and connotations depending on

the respective view point of the author who uses this term and the respective context. This is also true for the EU's Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management. The lack of precise definition is also based on the lack of applicability with regard to the respective scenarios where the comprehensive approach finds practical adoption.⁴

One has to distinguish clearly between a mere scientific and also sometimes too optimistic idea of a comprehensive approach and the practical implementation within a failed state or a crisis region. This becomes even more difficult if the gap between military and civilian concepts of crisis management is taken into consideration.⁵ Therefore a more precise definition of this concept valid for this paper has to be defined.

The 'overarching aim' of the comprehensive approach is to keep or restore peace in a crisis region like failing or failed states or states within a civil war / insurgency.⁶ But this approach can also be adopted in the case of a developing country with the exemption of the need for military force in order to ensure a safe and secure environment for the domestic population and the foreigner engaged in comprehensive development aid. The comprehensive approach is not an overarching political objective itself, but a toolset or a conceptual strategic guideline to overcome conflicts.

The overarching aim can be achieved by implementing 'strategic aims' of (re-)establishing or restoring confidence in collective action and transforming or building institutions which support the reconstruction and development as well as a safe and secure environment.⁷ Hence these strategic aims represent the traditional triad of concepts of security, good governance along with reconstruction and development.

⁴ *Johannsen*, The EU's Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management. Premises, Ambitions, Limits, pp. 48-70.

This work is a core publication on the EU's Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management. But this work has an institutional and strategic political focus, while this paper focuses on a more practical and operational level of the comprehensive approach.

⁵ *Johannsen* , pp. 50-53 and 60-64.

⁶ *Wittkowsky*, Vernetzte Sicherheit: Begriff, Einordnung und Umsetzung in der Konfliktbearbeitung. Thesenpapier zur Anhörung des Unterausschusses „Zivile Krisenprävention und vernetzte Sicherheit“ Berlin, ZIF, 26th March 2012, available at http://www.zif-berlin.org/fileadmin/uploads/analyse/dokumente/veroeffentlichungen/ZIF_Thesenpapier_UA_ZKvS-2012.pdf (24 February 2013).

⁷ World Bank: World development Report 2011. Conflict, Security and Development, Washington D.C. 2011, pp. 8ff., available at <http://www.uis.unesco.org/Library/Documents/world-development-report-education-2011-en.pdf> (26 May 2013).

The ‘scope of actors’ participating in the comprehensive approach is also defining the ‘level of cooperation’ meaning the national, international, host-nation and regional levels of cooperation. The level of cooperation and the strategic aims of the comprehensive approach make it unavoidable that non-governmental actors take part in the conflict resolution on probably nearly all levels of cooperation. A reduction of the comprehensive approach to a solely Whole-of-Government approach does not seem encouraging because in various fields of conflict resolution lags the capacities for conflict resolution or accesses to the conflict parties. Also for the field of economic development also non-state actors are necessary, e.g. to facilitate long-term and sustainable economic growth which is necessary to establish self-sustaining economy which is one very important pillar of conflict resolution.

The scope of involvement or level of action of the various actors does not stay the same during the phases of conflict resolution.⁸ Depending on the level of armed conflict between the conflict parties the level of military support varies. Ideally, in a phase of open armed conflict or increasing escalation, the level of military engagement, foreign as well as host-nation, is also increasing while the process of establishing good governance as well as reconstruction and development stagnates or decreases. The latter is especially true for foreign governmental and non-governmental aid agencies. With decreasing military engagement the level of military action decreases and the level of civilian aid increases. Main task of military stakeholders is training and partnering with host-nation security forces. Thus the level of action and the conducted tasks for different actors varies with the different phases of conflict resolution.⁹ But civil-military cooperation (CMC or CIMIC) are an essential part of EU’s tool set for comprehensive crisis management.¹⁰ Thus a general rule set or road map for future and also past conflicts is not possible.

A very important remark concerning the actors is the question of transaction costs resulting from an increasing number of participants. The more actors of different professional fields (civil, military, governmental, non-governmental, etc.) and nationalities participate the more the transaction costs rise due to the fact that the strategic aims of the mission of each actor might become opaque or contradictory. Thus the achievement of the overall aim of the

⁸ These phases are: Escalation, open conflict, post-conflict and peace-building. *Wittkowsky*, p. 2.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Johannsen*, p. 64.

mission becomes more costly and complex.¹¹ An additional reason for increasing transaction costs apart from the external actors is to a varying extent the capacity and willingness of the host nation and its elite to accept foreign aid and support.

Thus, the comprehensive approach is not a fixed rule book or tool set, it is a general concept of theories, mechanism, actors, varying scopes, and different levels of intensity which has to be readopted and redefined for each single conflict. It is a concept for coherent and coordinated intervention with civilian and military means to settle a conflict or prevent its escalation.¹²

3. Mali, its neighbours and the development of a regional conflict

The crisis in Mali is influenced by various factors. The colonial reign of the colonial power France as well as its ethnic composition and the artificial nation building in the course of the decolonialisation in the 1950s and 1960s have still influence on the situation in Mali and beyond. But also the geographic situation of the country and especial the three northern provinces of Timbuktu, Kidal, and Gao where the recent crisis had its most apparent manifestation. But the situation is much more complex and causes and triggers for the current crisis can be found also beyond the Malian territory in the Maghreb and Sahel regions as well as some specific countries like Algeria and Libya. Though the conflict has local, national and regional causes. But also as previously mentioned historical and political circumstances like bad governance and a lack of sustainable democratic development as well as ethnic, social and economic factors heavily influenced the current situation in Mali and the Sahel region. It would be insufficient to reduce the current crisis to a simple spillover effect of the Libyan civil war.¹³

¹¹ Wittkowsky, p. 4. The author defines six reasons for increasing transaction costs. These are: (i) increased effort in co-ordination; (ii) different legal standards, mandates, budgetary procedures, time frames, national caveats and cultures of participating organisations; (iii) different reporting systems as well as access to information; (iv) institutional egoism and inertia; (v) different opinion with regard to the use of military means (force); (vi) different interest (and aims).

¹² Gebhard, Das zivil-militärische Zusammenspiel im internationalen Krisenmanagement der EU, in: Feichtner / Gebhard (eds.): *Globe Sicherheit Europäische Potenzial Herausforderungen – Ansätze – Instrumente*, Wien, Köln, Weimar 2010, pp. 201-219, p. 205.

¹³ Marchal, The coup in Mali: the result of a long-term crisis or spillover from the Libyan civil war?, NOREF Report May 2012, available at http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/3a582f1883e8809a0e18cd2d58a09a81.pdf (15 April 2013).

3.1. Assessment of the complex situation in Mali

Mali is a landlocked country with an area of about 1.2 million km², which is the size of France, Germany, Benelux and Poland. The northern regions of Timbuktu, Kidal, and Gao have a size of about 937,000 km² which is around three quarters of the whole Malian territory and are situated in the Sahel-Sahara region. Despite the fact that the three northern regions represent 75 per cent of the Malian territory, only about 1.3 million people live there, which represents only 10 per cent of Mali's total population.¹⁴ It has a total borderline of 7,243 km with seven neighbouring countries.¹⁵

The region is populated mainly by four ethnic and linguistic groups: the Songray, Tuaregs, Fulani and Arabs. Other groups in the northern region are the Boso, Bambara, Dogon and Mossi. With regard to the distribution of the different socio-ethnic groups in the northern regions, the Songray, the local sedentary group, represent 35% of the population; the nomadic Tuaregs, Arabs and Fulani represent 32%; and the Boso, Bambara, Dogon and Mossi represent 33%. The Tuaregs form about 11% of the total population of the northern region of Mali.¹⁶ But why have they been able to destabilize that region, if their numbers is comparable small? One reason is that the leadership of the insurgency was Tuareg-led, but a relevant number of the fighting militias were of other ethnicities. Due to the end of Qaddafi's reign in Libya, these militias were able to organize sufficient supply of armoury, including also heavy weaponry. Furthermore, the Government of Mali failed to deliver basic governmental services, including the allocation of quantitative and qualitative sufficient security forces.

These remarks on Mali are necessary in order to understand why a comprehensive approach for a country like Mali is of such importance if the solution of the conflict and its root causes are the real aim of the efforts of the International Community (IC). These figures become also

¹⁴ African Union: Revised joint strategic concept of operations for the African-led International Support Mission in Mali and the Malian Defence and Security Forces to restore the authority of the State of Mali over its entire national territory, in: United Nations Security Council: Letter dated 15 March 2013 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, (S/2013/163) 15th March 2013, p. 5, available at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2013_163.pdf (02 April 2013).

¹⁵ These countries are: Algeria, Niger, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Senegal and Mauritania, available at <http://www.unodc.org/westandcentralafrica/en/National-Integrated-Programmes/mali.html> (05 April 2013).

¹⁶ *Kristensen/Ba*, Mapping the views, interests and expectations of the population in Mali, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF), Report April 2013, p. 2., available at http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/bb4cfb4033f0e70a5b2e0615d7e4b554.pdf (04 June 2013).

important if the number of Malian Defence and Security Forces (MDSF)¹⁷ are taken into consideration. The revised Concept of Operations (CONOPS) of the AFISMA mentions a total number of 10,500 MDSF personnel, which consist of 8,000 military personnel and 2,500 security forces.¹⁸ Currently there does not exist any reliable numbers concerning the present real staffing of the MDSF. The numbers of MDSF personnel do not consider rates of desertion¹⁹, casualties²⁰ or general understaffing, e.g. due to budgetary deficits. Furthermore these numbers do not mirror the desolate situation of the MDSF. These forces are chronically underfunded, poorly trained and morally wrecked due to the defeats suffered in 2012 during the fights for secession with the MNLA supported by various Islamist groups.²¹

The size of the country is also a reason of concern with regard to the establishment of a sustainable safe and secure environment. Various armed groups proved to be mobile²² and using insurgent tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), e.g. hit-and-run tactics, Improved Explosive Devices (IED)²³, suicide bombers²⁴, etc., which make it difficult for host-nation

¹⁷ The MDSF comprises the Malian Armed Forces (Army) and the security forces, consisting of police, gendarmerie (normally military police with rights of civilian law enforcement), national guards and civil protection services that will be involved in security tasks. See: UNSC (S/2013/163), p. 8.

¹⁸ UNSC (S/2013/163), p. 8. Library of Congress - Federal Research Division published slightly differing numbers concerning the MDSF for 2005. Library of Congress – Federal Research Division: Country Profile: Mali, January 2005, p. 20, available at <http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Mali.pdf> (27 April 2013).

¹⁹ Keenen; Mali's Tuareg rebellion: What next? 20th March 2012, available at <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/03/20123208133276463.html> (29 April 2013).

²⁰ An official announcement the MAF states that during the fights for the recapture of the northern Malian provinces against various Islamist groups from beginning of January 2013 until end of March 2013, the MAF suffered 63 casualties. Numbers of desertion were not published. But especially in 2012 members of the MAF defected to the MNLA. Agence France-Press: Mali: 63 soldats maliens et environ 600 islamistes tués depuis janvier, 27th March 2013, available at <http://www.afp.com/fr/node/879082> (29 April 2013). See also: Göbel, Bundeswehr-Ausbilder in Afrika. Turbo-Training für malische Rekruten, tagesschau.de, 29.04.2013, available at <http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/mali-ausbilder108.html> (29 April 2013).

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² Security Council: UN Political head tells Security Council concerted, broad-based measures needed to tackle Mali's deep-rooted challenges, outlines options for future UN involvement, (SC/10966) 03rd April 2013, p 3, available at <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc10966.doc.htm> (10 April 2013).

²³ Radio France International: Sixth French soldier killed in Mali, 30th April 2013, available at <http://www.english.rfi.fr/africa/20130430-sixth-french-soldier-killed-mali> (30 April 2013). Agence France-Presse: Mali conflict kills 5th French soldier, 17th March 2013, available at <http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Mali-conflict-kills-5th-French-soldier-20130317> (27 April 2013). See also: Diallo, Al Qaeda rebels wanted Mali as base for global attacks, Reuters, 08th March 2013, available at <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/03/08/us-mali-crisis-france-idUKBRE9270CC20130308> (27 April 2013).

²⁴ Agence France-Presse: Suicide blast in Timbuktu after mine kills two Mali troops, 31.03.2013, available at <http://reliefweb.int/report/mali/suicide-blast-timbuktu-after-mine-kills-two-mali-troops> (26 April 2013). See also: Hicks, Mali: Chad Plays Politics Over Costly Mali Deployment, 18th April 2013, available at http://allafrica.com/stories/201304190110.html?aa_source=slideout (26 April 2013). See also: Le Monde.fr avec AFP: Mali: attentat suicide près de Gao, deux soldats maliens et cinq islamistes tués, 04th May 2013, available at

and foreign security forces to fight these groups. The very long borderlines and the limited UN mandate make it difficult to chase the armed groups beyond the Malian borders, allowing these armed groups to establish safe heavens outside Mali or in remote areas within Malian territory. The size of the country and the length of its borders with its neighbours make a sufficient control of the territory for the MAF together with AFISMA / MINUSMA and French forces impossible. Even though if these forces would concentrate on the three northern provinces of Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal.

Even though comparisons with Afghanistan or other conflict areas are always difficult and mostly incongruous, they show that even with more than 100,000 foreign soldier and more than 200,000 Afghan National Security Forces, including police and armed forces as well as intelligence agencies, a country like Afghanistan with 652,230 sq km²⁵ was uncontrollable. And at a peak time of the conflict more than 50,000 foreign KFOR soldiers were deployed to the Kosovo – a country of only 10,887 sq km²⁶. Solely the northern provinces of Timbuktu, Kidal, and Gao have a size of about 937.000 sq km. In a mid-term perspective the national and international security forces would add up to about 11,200 MINUSMA military personnel, 1440 MINUSMA police personnel, about 8,000 MAF and 1,000 French soldiers of Operation Serval. These numbers do not comprise Malian police due to the fact that current numbers and an assessment of their capacities are not available. Furthermore these numbers do not include militias or local self-defence groups loyal to the Malian government. A reliable assessment of these militia forces is difficult and especially the long lasting loyalty of such forces of Tuareg origin is difficult. This became evident at the beginning of May 2013 when a group of Tuareg leaders announced a new group in the Kidal – the so called High Council of the Azawad. This new group - according to its own statements – does not seek for independence from Mali, but wants to support a dialogue with the Malian government about conflict settlement, but not mentioning a more precise own roadmap or aspects for settlement. This group denied access to the city of Kidal for French and Malian troops.²⁷ The High

http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2013/05/04/mali-attentat-suicide-pres-de-gao-deux-soldats-maliens-et-cinq-islamistes-tues_3171144_3212.html (05 May 2013). See also: BBC: Two Malian soldiers killed in suicide attack near Gao, available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-22416987> (10 May 2013). Reuters: Three suicide attacks strike army, Nigerien soldiers in Mali, 10th May 2013, available at <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/10/us-mali-attack-idUSBRE9490DT20130510> (23 May 2013).

²⁵ <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html> (23 May 2013).

²⁶ <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kv.html> (23 May 2013).

²⁷ AFP (ed.): Nord du Mali: Compaoré veut dialoguer avec la rébellion MNLA, 14th May 2013, available at

Council of the Azawad constitutes this measure as protection of the lighter-skinned local population against serious and systematic violations of human rights committed by the MAF.²⁸ But these numbers clearly show the quantitative dimension of securing and controlling the Malian territory respectively the northern provinces. But these numbers also show that a sustainable conflict resolution can only be achieved together with the majority of the local communities and ethnicities.

But a focus on these figures as well as a focus on the conflict parties distract from the relevant matters which made the temporary secession of northern Mali possible and are also relevant for the crisis beyond Mali. The root causes of the crisis lie mainly in the general bad governance of northern Mali, Mali as a whole and furthermore vast areas of the Sahel region accompanied by a severe grade of corruption within all levels of government and administration.²⁹ Beyond that the lack of state authority in Mali³⁰ but also in various regions beyond lead to an environment fostering terrorism, transnational organized crime such as kidnapping, smuggling and trafficking of drugs, human beings and weapons. Furthermore it promoted famine and the spillover effects of poverty and underdevelopment on the security landscape. But also environmental degradation and ethno-confessional grievances were the results of the absence of policy strategies and state authority.³¹ This is also insofar true that conflict parties like some Tuareg clan or Islamist groups are only able to gain control over a territory such as the northern Malian one, if the relevant government and especially its

<http://reliefweb.int/report/mali/nord-du-mali-compar%C3%A9-veut-dialoguer-avec-la-r%C3%A9bellion-mnla> (26 May 2013).

²⁸ *Ahmed*, (Associated Press): Tuareg leaders announce new group in northern Mali, 06th May 2013, available at http://www.mercurynews.com/breaking-news/ci_23180211/tuareg-leaders-announce-new-group-northern-mali (10 May 2013). See also: AFP: Mali Tuaregs reject army presence in bastion for July vote, 23th May 2013, available at <http://reliefweb.int/report/mali/mali-tuaregs-reject-army-presence-bastion-july-vote> (24 May 2013).

²⁹ Mali ranks on position 105 of 176 of the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International. Transparency International: Corruption Perception Index 2012, Berlin 2012, available at http://files.transparency.org/content/download/537/2229/file/2012_CPI_brochure_EN.pdf (24 May 2013). See also: International Crisis Group (Mali): Security, Dialogue and Meaningful Reform. Executive Summary and Recommendations, Africa Report N°201, Dakar / Brussels 11th April 2013, p. 2, available at [http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/west-africa/mali/201-mali-securiser-dialoguer-et-reformer-en-profondeur-english.pdf](http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/mali/201-mali-securiser-dialoguer-et-reformer-en-profondeur-english.pdf) (24 May 2013).

³⁰ *Nickels*, Analysing the Crisis in the Sahel. Geneva Centre for Security Policy, GCSP Policy Paper 2013/3, 25 March 2013, p. 3, available at <http://www.gcsp.ch/content/download/11819/144853/download> (22 April 2013). See also: *Cristiani/Fabiani*, From Disfunctionality to Disaggregation and Back? The Malian Crisis, Local Players and European Interests, IAI Working Papers 13/08 – March 2013, p. 3, available at <http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/iaiw1308.pdf> (24 May 2013).

³¹ *Cristiani/Fabiani*, p. 14.

defence and security forces are not able to identify and counter the evolving threats. In Mali it was a mixture of governmental unwillingness to enforce state authority in the three northern regions of the country and the lack of ability of state authorities, in this case the MDSF, to take adequate measures to enforce state authority.³²

3.2. The major conflict parties in Mali and beyond

Like mentioned above one of the major conflict parties is the Malian government and its institutions, especially the MAF. For decades the Malian government and its security institutions were facing various upheavals of Tuareg people.³³ But generally spoken the latest Tuareg rebellion is just another symptom of governmental failure and misbehaviour triggered by the Libyan civil war.³⁴ For nearly more than two decades, after the overthrow of the former president Moussa Traoré, the leader of the military junta, Mali was perceived by a majority of observers as a model of successful African democratization. But the current political developments disclose that the democratic image of Mali and political reality have drifted apart since several years. A precise prioritization of government failures which caused the collapse of the state is difficult to analyse. The Malian government suffered from endemic corruption, weak state capacity to deliver basic services and a low level of legitimacy of state institutions and the general political system.³⁵ But one core root of the failure was and probably still is the high corruption of the Malian government and its authorities, including the MAF. Corruption generally weakens the authority and legitimacy of a government, but in the Malian case corruption had also a direct impact on the security situation. While the Malian government received aid resources to fight against AQIM, these resources were rarely allocated to the proper institutions in northern Mali. Neither the capacities of the MAF were reinforced nor the local population gained access to social services. These developments paved the way for an easy victory of the Tuareg insurgents and their Islamist supporters. On the one hand the desolate situation of the army resulted in soldiers deserting from the MAF

³² *Ibid.*, p. 4.

³³ The Tuareg rebellions since Malian independence (1960): 1st rebellion: 1961 to 1964, 2nd rebellion: 1990 to 1995, 3rd rebellion 2007 to 2009 and last rebellion: since 2012. *Kolb*, Wer sind die Tuareg, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V., Länderbericht, 05th February 2013, p. 3, available at <http://www.kas.de/senegal-mali/de/publications/33435/> (22 April 2013).

³⁴ *Marchal*, pp. 2f..

³⁵ United Nations Security Council: Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali, S/2013/189, 26 March 2013, para. 34, available at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2013_189.pdf (10 April 2013).

and on the other hand facilitated recruitment of the insurgents and terrorists among the local population.³⁶

Another aspect directly linked to corruption is the level of criminalisation of the ruling elites and civil servants of various institutions.³⁷ Mali and especially the capital of Bamako has become an international hub for drug trafficking.³⁸ This development is unlikely without the support or at least tolerance of state officials. It results in a further weakening of the position of the government and its institutions. The other main conflict party are the various Tuareg tribes which settle in Northern Mali but also the whole Sahel region. They comprise about ten per cent of the 16 million Malian citizens.³⁹ But the faction of Tuareg is far away from being a homogeneous body.⁴⁰ Beside the Tuaregs which formed the secular MNLA there are also Tuaregs who joined Ansar Dine, a splinter group of AQIM. But there is also civil Tuareg opposition to the radicalization in northern Mali, like youth groups, women's organisations or Imams. The majority of the Tuareg population does not support the idea of national independence of a Tuareg state like the Azawad and rejects also the implementation of a Sharia.⁴¹ In order to understand the special situation of the Tuareg ethnicity in Mali and to develop perspectives for dialogue and reconciliation, a view back in history has to be done. The tradition of resistance against the ruling authorities reaches back into the 19th century when the Tuareg were opposing French ruling. This resistance led to a state of marginalization of the Tuareg people resulting in hunger crises and led to the first Tuareg rebellion in 1914. Furthermore the abolition of slavery by the French colonial administration had another impact on the Tuareg society. This social crisis became even more severe when the French colonial authorities handed over administrative duties to African people in the course of the decolonization.

³⁶ See footnote 27 on Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index.

³⁷ *Berghezan*, Panorama du trafic de cocaïne en Afrique de l'Ouest, Les Rapports du GRIP, June 2012, pp. 27-29, available at www.grip.org/sites/grip.org/files/RAPPORTS/2012/Rapport_2012-6.pdf (25 May 2013).

³⁸ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC): Drug Trafficking as a Security Threat in West Africa, November 2008, pp. 19f., available at <http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Drug-Trafficking-WestAfrica-English.pdf> (26 March 2013).

³⁹ *Kolb*, p. 1.

⁴⁰ *Marchal*, p. 4.

⁴¹ *Lohmann*, Mali nach dem Militärputsch. Stresstest für die Demokratie, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Mali, Mai 2012, pp. 3-5, available at <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/09082.pdf> (26 February 2013). See also: *Kolb*, p. 5.

Governance Indicator ⁴²	Sources	Year	Percentile Rank	Governance Score	Standard Error
			(0-100)	(-2.5 to +2.5)	
Voice and Accountability	16	2011	54.9	+0.14	0.11
	14	2006	56.3	+0.28	0.13
	8	2002	54.8	+0.27	0.18
Political Stability/ Absence of Violence	7	2011	24.1	-0.71	0.24
	6	2006	56.7	+0.35	0.27
	3	2002	56.7	+0.30	0.40
Government Effectiveness	11	2011	21.3	-0.83	0.18
	10	2006	27.3	-0.74	0.18
	6	2002	31.7	-0.60	0.22
Regulatory Quality	10	2011	38.4	-0.40	0.16
	9	2006	35.8	-0.44	0.18
	6	2002	36.3	-0.46	0.23
Rule of Law	15	2011	35.7	-0.50	0.13
	13	2006	45.9	-0.31	0.16
	9	2002	44.5	-0.32	0.21
Control of Corruption	12	2011	31.8	-0.61	0.16
	10	2006	40.0	-0.41	0.16
	5	2002	35.1	-0.53	0.29

Fig. 1 Wordbank: World Governance Indicators 2012

During this transfer of authority the Tuareg were neglected and were suddenly ruled by their former slaves, mainly sub-Saharan / black-African people. After Malian independence the Tuareg tradition and way of living was still marginalized. These developments resulted in a perception of suppression and exclusion from social and political participation of the Tuareg people.⁴³ But another aspect of the mind-set of the Tuareg has to be mentioned in order to understand the deep rooted grievance between the Tuareg and most of the black-African ethnicities. The Tuareg are convinced of their superior descent towards the black-African

⁴² Wordbank: World Governance Indicators 2012 – Mali, available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_chart.asp# (26 May 2013). The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) are a research dataset summarizing the views on the quality of governance provided by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. These data are gathered from a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and private sector firms.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

ethnicities.⁴⁴ This conflict of identities makes an acceptance of black-African rule over Tuareg people and peaceful co-existence even more difficult.⁴⁵

During the last five decades the ongoing marginalization together with the above mentioned conflict of identities, the Tuareg people developed the opinion that secession and self-government would be the solution for their destiny. Therefore the coup d'état together with the collapse of the Qaddafi regime were the ideal conditions for Tuareg secession. And the MNLA was founded by returning Tuareg soldiers of Qaddafi's army in 2011. An important aspect of the MNLA is that the group is considered to be secular which later on resulted in a discord with Ansar Dine and MUJWA⁴⁶ about the establishment of the Sharia in the occupied areas and finally in the total dissolution of MNLA as power-broker in the three northern provinces.⁴⁷

These aspects of Tuareg self-perception have to be taken into consideration if a dialogue and reconciliation commission wants to settle the conflict between the Tuareg and the predominant black-African Malian population.

The fact that numerous Tuareg groups like High Council of the Azawad or MNLA factions distanced from the claim of total independence for northern Mali proves that they are at least willing to negotiate with the Malian government.⁴⁸ Even though, these groups still demand negotiations on increased autonomy.

The Islamic Movement for the Azawad (MIA) is a newly formed group, recently splintered off from Ansar Dine. It is an Islamic organization – like Ansar Dine mainly comprising members of Tuareg origin - but has rejected armed fighting. MIA has requested dialogue with the government of Mali. And its leader, Algabas Ag Intalla, took already part in negotiations in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso with the Malian government in 2012. At that time he took part

⁴⁴ *Wiedemann*, *Kriegsziel Restauration? Über Nationbuilding und Erneuerung in Mali*, Berlin March 2013, p. 4, available at www.boell.de/downloads/201303_Kriegsziel_Restauration.pdf (25 May 2013).

⁴⁵ *Kolb*, p. 4. See also: *Cisse*, *Malian army advances on key rebel-held town*, Agence France-Press, 04 June 2013, available at <http://reliefweb.int/report/mali/malian-army-advances-key-rebel-held-town> (05 June 2013).

⁴⁶ *Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa*.

⁴⁷ *Diallo/Diarra*, *Islamists declare full control of Mali's north*, Reuters, 28th June 2012, available at <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/28/us-mali-crisis-idUSBRE85R15720120628> (25 May 2013).

⁴⁸ 2^{ème} *Congres ordinaire du Mouvement National de Libération de l'Azawad (MNLA)*, 15 Janvier 2013, available at <http://www.mnlamov.net/projet-politique.html> (04 June 2013).

as representative for Ansar Dine.⁴⁹

Two other main conflict parties, directly linked to the Tuareg movement of MNLA are the Islamist terror groups of Ansar Dine⁵⁰ and AQIM. In the beginning of the Tuareg rebellion Ansar Dine and AQIM supported the MNLA. But in the course of the successful secession these groups hijacked the rebellion and excluded MNLA due to disputes over the establishment of the Sharia in the occupied areas. Ansar Dine and AQIM are Islamic terror organisations. Ansar Dine has the strategic aim to establish the Sharia in Mali and an Islamic state. AQIM's aims are fourfold: Firstly, AQIM wants to overthrow the Algerian government; secondly, it wants to establish and preserve safe heavens among the Tuareg tribes of Mali, Niger, and Mauritania; thirdly, it wants to exploit the various Tuareg tribes to join the fight against governments in AQIM's area of operation; and fourthly AQIM wants to terrorize European countries by supporting its affiliated members in Europe.⁵¹

Despite the fact that these two groups had a significant impact on the developments in northern Mali for the period of April 2012 until March 2013, their general impact on the situation in northern Mali should not be overestimated. The previously mentioned strategic aim of AQIM to establish and preserve safe heavens in Mali and various other countries of the Sahel region clearly states that at least AQIM needs the support and allowance of local communities to hide there, similar to the situation of Al Qaida in Pakistan and Afghanistan, where Al Qaida also needed the support and permission of local Pashtun tribes to stay in the Pashtun settlement areas. Furthermore the local population in northern Mali might sympathise with AQIM or Ansar Dine because these groups offer solutions for the needs of the people and fill the gap of governmental shortcomings. But religious preferences were of less

⁴⁹ *Lacher/Tull*, Mali: Beyond Counterterrorism, SWP Comments, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, February 2013, p. 3, available at http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2013C07_lac_tll.pdf (18 March 2013). See also: *Polgreen*, Faction Splits From Islamist Group in Northern Mali, New York Times, 24th January 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/25/world/africa/faction-splits-from-islamist-group-in-northern-mali.html?_r=1& (27 May 2013). See also: RFI: Mali: des membres d'Ansar Dine font sécession et créent leur propre mouvement, 24th January 2013, available at <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20130124-mali-membres-ansar-dine-font-secession-creent-leur-propre-mouvement-mouvement-islamique-azawad> (27 May 2013).

⁵⁰ Also called Ansar al-Dine (AAD), which translates into 'Defenders of the Faith'. Ansar Dine was created in late 2011 after Ansar Dine's leader, Iyad ag Ghali, failed in an attempt to take over a secular Tuareg organization MNLA due to his extremist views. US Department of State: Terrorist Designations of Ansar al-Dine, 21 March 2013, available at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/03/206493.htm> (27 May 2013).

⁵¹ *Larémont*, Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, in: *Cigar/Kramer*, (eds.), Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War. A Global Perspective of Successes, Failures, and Prospects, Marine Corps University Press Quantico, Virginia, 2011, pp. 129-149, here p. 137, available at http://minerva.marinecorpsuniversity.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Al_Qaida_Body_LOWRES2.pdf (04 June 2013).

importance and the establishment of Sharia seems to be contra productive. Although the numbers of supporters of these groups have increased since years, this development is limited mainly to the urban areas and faces a notional presence in the rural areas which predominant the geography of northern Mali. The same is valid for Salafism in northern Mali. Salafism is part of the Malian society, influenced by actors from Saudi Arabia, but it is still a minor milieu and like the support for AQIM and Ansar Dine mainly linked to the urban areas. And like the support for AQIM and Ansar Dine the support for Salafism is attributable significantly to economic incentives.⁵²

Even though the other Malian ethnicities seem currently not to participate in the conflict directly, they should be part of the national dialogue together with stakeholders of the civil society. This is important for two reasons: firstly, the Malian crisis is a political and social systemic crisis. It is important that all social groups directly and indirectly affected by the Malian crisis which does not only take place in the three northern provinces of Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal but the whole country are considered. A sustainable solution is only possible with all stakeholders involved and with the possibility to voice their concerns, opinions, and claims. Secondly, all social groups have to be part of the national dialogue in order to avoid the impression that the ones who raised weapons and started an armed conflict will be rewarded and will benefit solely from the conflict. If such beliefs would spread among Malian ethnicities, a widening and deepening of the gap between the various Malian ethnicities is probable. Especially a growing marginalization of the Tuareg ethnicity is probable, due to the fact that they were perceived as trigger for the current crisis.⁵³ This might lead to further grievances and clashes which would cause an escalation of the still unsolved crisis.

The above mentioned assumptions suggest that a dialogue between all ethnicities, social communities as well as political groups which are willing to take part in peaceful negotiations on conflict resolution is key to the Malian crisis. The Tuareg play a vital role in these negotiations. They are part of the problem and key to its solution. Their history of marginalization for decades and their alienating self-image caused the current crisis. But the

⁵² *Marchal*, p. 5. See also: *Kolb* Welche Strategie für Mali? Mögliche Unterstützungsmassnahmen für Deutschland und die EU, KAS Policy Paper, 27th February 2013, p. 2, available at <http://www.kas.de/senegal-mali/de/publications/33653/> (22 April 2013).

⁵³ *Francis*, The regional impact of the armed conflict and French intervention in Mali, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF) Report April 2013, p. 4, available at http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/f18726c3338e39049bd4d554d4a22c36.pdf (22 April 2013). See also: *Kolb* (Strategie), p. 3.

Tuareg's support in order to deny groups like Ansar Dine, AQIM or MUJWA the entrance to and safe haven in Mali is crucial. Due to their nomadic tradition the Tuareg know the regions of northern Mali and beyond the best, especially the most remote areas like the mountainous areas of Ageulhok and Tessalit. And also the fight against the transnational organized crime is only possible in cooperation with the various Tuareg tribes and not against them. Due to the fact that the various Tuareg tribes are at least partially heavily involved in the transnational organized crime, alternative income sources and employment have to be created. A partial solution is again the integration of some Tuareg into the MNSF. But for this measure further measure of SSR have to be initialized.⁵⁴

3.3. Characterizing Mali's neighbouring countries and the Sahel region with regard to the conflict resolution

The neighbouring countries play a crucial role in a concept of sustainable conflict resolution. Especially for the Malian crisis the regional organisation 'Economic Community of West African States' (ECOWAS)⁵⁵ became a centre piece of the immediate crisis response despite the fact that critical players like Mauritania, Algeria, Libya and Chad are not members of ECOWAS. Even though Chad is no ECOWAS member, it contributed a significant part to AFISMA and was accompanying French troops in the fight against the insurgents in northern Mali.

On the one hand the neighbouring countries represent troop contributing nations taking actively part in AFISMA and probably also in MINUSMA. Hence the neighbouring countries make an important contribution to the initial internal stabilization of the Malian conflict. But on the other hand they are immanent part of the crisis. The Sahel region and countries sharing territory with this region are seen as a region contributing to extremist violence through bad governance, poverty, grievance between various ethnicities and religious groups as well as various kinds of insecurity accompanied by humanitarian crisis due to drought and internal armed conflicts. These internal conflicts resulted in thousands of people being internal

⁵⁴ Some of these measures are: sufficient and constant payment of MNSF in order to avoid defection and corruption, parliamentarian control over MNSF, vetting of the MNSF personnel in order to control defection or fraud and to guarantee transparency.

⁵⁵ In French also 'Communauté économique des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest' (CEDEAO). ECOWAS comprises the countries of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. See <http://www.ecowas.int/>.

displaced or refugees and by this contributing additionally to the worsening of the humanitarian crisis. Often these internal armed conflicts are linked to bad governance with regard to (perceived) marginalization of minorities and the associated unbalanced distribution of resources. Another factor is the rise of global jihad which seriously deteriorated after the events of 11th September 2001 and the resulting US-led global 'war-on-terrorism'.⁵⁶

The countries of the Sahel and Maghreb regions, as well as the West African countries have to strengthen the coherence of the combined efforts in order to fight regional terrorism and transnational organized crime. This is fundamental due to the fact that traditionally the borders created in the wake of the decolonization lack the legitimacy. Furthermore the countries of these regions lack the techniques, personnel and equipment to effectively observe their borders and to prohibit illegal border crossing. A closer cooperation would probably not eliminate these problems, but might in the long-term perspective increase significantly state authority and also state visibility in these regions and by this strengthening the legitimacy and authority of the relevant states. An enhanced cooperation would also exacerbate the supply with and transfer of weapons, personnel and equipment between various state territories. This might have an impact especially on the transnational organized crime because it would increase cost and reduce the profit which would make these businesses less attractive.

But the common effort is not only necessary to take effective measures against regional terrorism and transnational organized crime but also to preserve the achievements and to avoid displacement effects and spillovers. If only a single state or a minor group of states effectively fights extremist militias or organized crime in one region, it is probable that these subversive elements might withdraw and re-group in neighbouring countries and establish there a new regime of crime and terror.⁵⁷ Furthermore it is also possible that these subversive elements might re-infiltrate their former area of operation, when the effort of the security forces and state authorities decreases. But a realistic cooperation between the states is seriously deranged due to interpersonal grievance between leading politicians as well as the Heads of State and Government, struggle for regional hegemony, diplomatic competition for

⁵⁶ Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN): Understanding the causes of violent extremism in West Africa, 10 May 2013, available at <http://www.irinnews.org/Report/98012/Understanding-the-causes-of-violent-extremism-in-West-Africa> (10 May 2013).

⁵⁷ IRIN (causes).

international recognition as well as disputes over shares in external assistance and development aid.⁵⁸

The attack on a military base and a French uranium mine⁵⁹ in Niger on 23rd / 24th May 2013 show the linkage between the security situations of the Western Africa countries. Mokhtar Belmokhtar⁶⁰, a leader of AQIM stated that the involved terrorist who conducted the operations were under his command and that the attacks were a retaliation for Niger's role in a French-led war on Islamists in Mali. Belmokhtar's troops were reinforced by MUJWA fighters.⁶¹ Belmokhtar is considered to be the organizer of the attacks and mass hostage-taking at Tigantourine gas facility near In Amenas, Algeria on 16th January 2013. This terrorist act at In Amenas was said to be retaliation for the permission of the Algerian government to grant French forces the right to fly over national Algerian airspace in the course of the beginning intervention in Mali.⁶²

Due to a comparable ethnic composition concerning the Tuareg like Mali, Niger faces also comparable threats like Mali. About 9.3 per cent of the 16.9 million inhabitants are of Tuareg origin.⁶³ Niger experienced also, like Mali, an influx of Tuareg and Islamist rebels over the past years. And therefore it is not surprising that Niger voluntarily contributed Nigerien soldiers to AFISMA, in order to avoid further escalation of the Malian crisis, which might trigger a spillover of Islamist and Tuareg aggression. But despite the fact that the Tuaregs in both countries faced perceived neglect and marginalization by the respective governments, as well as not fulfilled peace agreements, the geographic, demographic and political circumstances are quite different. The Tuareg in Niger are spread across the country which hampers secession and fosters integration. Furthermore the recent Nigerien peace agreement

⁵⁸ *Pouya*, The Solution to the Malian crisis lies in the Maghreb, 05th May 2013, available at http://www.centre4s.org/en/images/doc/The_solution_to_the_Mali_crisis_lies_in_the_Maghreb.pdf (12 May 2013).

⁵⁹ The Arlit uranium mine is 64 per cent owned by French company Areva and 36 per cent by Niger's government. Radio France International (RFI) (ed.): Belmokhtar jihadi group threatens more Niger attacks 24th May 2013, available at <http://www.english.rfi.fr/africa/20130524-belmokhtar-jihadi-group-threatens-more-niger-attacks> (26 May 2013).

⁶⁰ Chad's army claimed Belmokhtar was killed in northern Mali this year but Western intelligence services had played down reports of the veteran jihadist's death. *Massalatchi*, Niger attacks are 'shockwave' of Mali conflict, Reuters, 25th May 2013, available at <http://news.yahoo.com/niger-attacks-shockwave-mali-conflict-075339499.html> (26 May 2013).

⁶¹ *Ibid.* See also: RFI (Belmokhtar).

⁶² *Chikhi*, Thirty hostages reported killed in Algeria assault, Reuters, 17th January 2013, available at <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/17/us-sahara-crisis-idUSBRE90F1JJ20130117> (26 May 2013).

⁶³ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): World Fact Book: Niger. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ng.html> (04 June 2013).

tries to avoid mistakes of past agreements, e.g. including economic development and political integration. Additionally Nigerien Tuareg agreed on disarmament while Malian Tuareg still nowadays insist on keeping their weapons.⁶⁴

Another neighbouring country which is on the one hand directly affected by the Malian crisis but on the other hand itself influenced negatively the development of the Malian crisis is Algeria. Algeria's political development influences the current Malian crisis in that way that during the Algerian civil war in the 1990s various regional Islamist groups, notably AQIM, evolved and are currently active in Mali. And Algeria is affected by the situation in Mali due to the fact that the Algeria government and its security authorities fear an influx of Islamist extremist from Mali to Algeria because of the ongoing military operations in Mali which probably induces a displacement effect. This is also the reason why Algeria opposed any military intervention in Mali. A situation which indicates this development is the terror attack on the previously mentioned In Amenas gas field.⁶⁵

Beside Niger and Algeria, the government of Nigeria assesses the Malian crisis as a national security threat, even though Nigeria does not share a common border with Mali. The threat evolves from Boko Haram, a Salafi-jihadi group which is based in Nigeria's north-western states but operates throughout Nigeria and has the potential of destabilizing Nigeria.⁶⁶ Therefore the Nigeria's contribution to AFISMA can be assessed as a pre-emptive measure against growing regional Islamist extremism which might be supportive to Boko Haram and therefore dangerous for Nigeria.⁶⁷

Beside an enhanced cooperation in security affairs, a better cooperation in diplomatic and economic affairs is also essential. But a first step might be the proper implementation of the revised Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States and to establish a common economic area. But like in Mali also other ECOWAS member states face the

⁶⁴ IRIN: Can Niger offer Mali lessons on the Tuareg? 11 April 2011, available at <http://www.irinnews.org/report/97823/can-niger-offer-mali-lessons-on-the-tuareg> (14 April 2013). See also: Agence France-Press (AFP): Mali: Tuareg rebels refuse to disarm, take part in Mali polls, 24 April 2013, available at <http://reliefweb.int/report/mali/tuareg-rebels-refuse-disarm-take-part-mali-polls> (14 May 2013). See also: Francis, p. 11.

⁶⁵ Francis, p. 10f.

⁶⁶ Boko Haram calls itself Jama'at ahl al-sunna li-da'wa wa-l-qital which can be translated to "(western) education is forbidden". Cook, The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria, in CTC Sentinel, Vol. 4 issue 9, September 2011, pp. 3-5, here p. 4., available at <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/CTCSentinel-Vol4Iss92.pdf> (25 May 2013).

⁶⁷ Francis, p. 11.

problem of non-efficient political systems and suffer from bad governance which hamper decision making and political cooperation between ECOWAS member states.⁶⁸

All these measures would be an important contribution to the sustainable success of a comprehensive approach. But it is improbable that the countries of the Maghreb and Sahel regions as well as West Africa would be able to carry that burden on their own. A long-lasting assistance, especially financial assistance, of major western countries would be fundamental. But this assistance has to be guaranteed for a longer period, making the assistance a political strategy instead of the usual short term aid which effects vanish quickly and are not sustainable. A proper assessment of the duration for such strategic commitment is difficult but it can easily reach a period of ten or even more years.⁶⁹

4. The EUTM and EU's crisis management in Mali

From a first perspective the EUTM Mali seems at least partially to break with a quite recent tradition of the EU to prefer civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions instead of military operations. Since 2003 the EU has deployed ten SSR missions or missions with SSR-related tasks out of overall 27 military operations or civilian missions within the framework of CSDP. Of these ten missions six took or still take place in Africa.⁷⁰ Of these 27 missions and operations, only eight are of military nature which stresses the Union's intention to empower states and their governments as well as regional organizations or actors to cope with their own domestic or regional challenges and to foster the idea of ownership. EUTM Somalia and EUTM Mali are designed as military operations but they fulfill exclusively SSR-related tasks and by this count as SSR-mission.

⁶⁸ Cernicky, Was nützt die ECOWAS? In: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (ed.): *Auslandsinformationen*, Berlin, 3. September 2007, pp. 78-111, here p. 110f., available at http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_11781-544-1-30.pdf (24 May 2013). See also: IRIN (causes).

⁶⁹ Labusquière, Mali: A New Development Contract. What kind of aid is needed to end the crisis, OXFAM Briefing Note, 15th May 2013, p. 2, available at <http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bn-mali-new-development-contract-150513-en.pdf> (24 May 2013).

⁷⁰ European External Action Service: Overview of the missions and operations of the European Union April 2013, available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations.aspx?lang=en> (06 May 2013). See also: *Oksamytna*, The European Union Training Mission in Somalia: Lessons Learnt for EU Security Sector Reform, IAI Working Papers 11/16, June 2011, p. 2, available at http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/130855/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/08fb8c83-6bff-4edb-83d5-e5a827d9d146/en/iawp1116.pdf (26 March 2013).

The objectives of the EUTM are to grant military and training advice to the MAF “*in order to contribute to the restoration of their military capacity with a view to enabling them to conduct military operations aiming at restoring Malian territorial integrity and reducing the threat posed by terrorist groups*”⁷¹. The objectives are derived from the operational needs of the MAF. Beside the already mentioned general training support, the operational needs defined by the EU also include the topics of command and control, logistical chain, human resources, International Humanitarian Law, protection of civilians as well as human rights.⁷² Furthermore EUTM shall strengthen the conditions for proper political control by legitimate civilian authorities of the MAF.⁷³

The objectives of EUTM are embedded in a wider framework of a general strategic mandate and its respective objectives. This mandate is in line with the EU ‘Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel’⁷⁴:

“The EU’s objective is to enable the Malian authorities to:

a. Restore constitutional and democratic order in Mali through the implementation of a credible and consensual road map which foresees free, transparent and fair elections in 2013 and a framework for negotiations with armed groups rejecting terrorism;

b. Re-establish the state’s authority throughout the country and redeploy it effectively in a context of peace and reconciliation between communities while respecting the rule of law and human rights;

*c. Neutralize organised crime and terrorist threats.”*⁷⁵

This outlined strategic mandate and its respective objectives shall be achieved beside general “*training support for the benefit of the MAF*”⁷⁶ through the EUTM by:

“2. (b) training and advice on command and control, logistical chain and human resources, as

⁷¹ Council of the European Union: Council Decision 2013/34/CFSP of 17 January 2013 on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian Armed Forces (EURM Mali), OJ 2013 L 14/19, Art. 1, 2. (a), available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:014:0019:0021:EN:PDF> (10 February 2013).

⁷² EU Council: Council Decision 2013/34/CFSP, Art. 1, 2. (b).

⁷³ EU Council: Council Decision 2013/34/CFSP, Art. 1, 3.

⁷⁴ European Union External Action Service: Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel, available at http://www.eeas.europa.eu/africa/docs/sahel_strategy_en.pdf (10 February 2013). See also: *Hatzigeorgopoulos*, The EU’s Strategy for the Sahel: A New Turn in EU External Action? *ISIS Europe*, *European Security Review* 64, January 2013, pp. 1-4, available at http://www.isis-europe.eu/sites/default/files/publications-downloads/esr64_SahelStrategy_Jan2013MH_0.pdf (16 March 2013).

⁷⁵ European External Action Service: Common Security and Defence Policy. EU Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali), updated February 2013, p. 1, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/1892457/factsheet_eutm_mali_en_.pdf (16 March 2013).

⁷⁶ EU Council: Council Decision 2013/34/CFSP, Art. 1, 2. (a).

well as training on International Humanitarian Law, protection of civilians and human rights.

3. EUTM Mali shall aim at strengthening conditions for proper political control by legitimate civilian authorities of the MAF.

4. The activities of EUTM Mali shall be conducted in close coordination with other actors involved in the support to the MAF, in particular the United Nations (UN) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).” 77

While some aspects of the general strategic mandate and its respective objectives have already been achieved others remain unsolved and even the measures to achieve these objectives are unclear. Beyond others a *road map which foresees free, transparent and fair elections in 2013 and a framework for negotiations with armed groups rejecting terrorism* has been approved by the Cabinet du Premier Ministre.⁷⁸ Also the first step to re-establishment of state authority has been achieved through French and ECOWAS intervention. There have been single security related incidents like road side bombings and suicide attacks on national and international security forces but recently these incidents were not able to destabilize the northern provinces again. And currently such destabilization seems unlikely. Even though there are regions like the city of Kidal where limited armed conflicts might evolve due to ethnic tensions.

The aimed *political control by legitimate civilian authorities of the MAF* is part of EUTM. But it is questionable who these civilian authorities are or will be. Parliamentary control over armed forces is not a Malian political tradition. And it is doubtful that an EU mission will be able to address this severe political lack of understanding of the political elite of Mali. This would be the objective of diplomatic affairs and not of a SSR-mission.

The *coordination with other actors involved in the support to the MAF* will probably be achieved via coordination boards and liaison officers of the various contributing organizations as EU, UN, AU, and ECOWAS. For the coordination of humanitarian actors the EU reiterates the predominant role of the UN.⁷⁹

The EU conceives of its crisis management activities as a way not only to settle armed conflicts, bring stability to war-torn societies and to offer neutral dispute settlement to the

⁷⁷ Council Decision 2013/34/CFSP, Art. 1.

⁷⁸ Cabinet du Premier Ministre: Feuille de Route pour la Transition, 29 January 2013, available at http://donor-conference-mali.eu/sites/default/files/generated/pdf/page/2_Feuille%20de%20Route%20Mali%20version%20finale%2026%20janvier%202013.pdf (10 February 2013).

⁷⁹ Council of the European Union: Council conclusions on Mali, Press Release, 3217th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 17 January 2013, para. 5, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/134770.pdf (10 February 2013).

involved conflict parties but also to transmit European values. The EUTM's training includes modules on International Humanitarian Law, protection of civilians and human rights.⁸⁰

A relevant shortcoming of the EUTM is the lack of support for the Malian Security Forces, which play a crucial role in the fight against the terrorist groups and to establish and maintain a safe and secure environment within the Malian territory. Furthermore a functioning police is necessary to establish a functioning rule of law and is part of Good Governance. A close cooperation between armed forces and security forces is especially in the beginning of the fight against the insurgency crucial. Thus a widening of the EUTM mandate from MAF to all MNSF is necessary in order to reach the mandates aim of *respecting the rule of law and human rights*. Because it would be contradictory, if the EUTM might be successful in implementing a regime which leads to acceptance of *International Humanitarian Law, protection of civilians and human rights* within the MAF but for instance the Police or Gendarmerie does not obey these standards and commits human rights violations because of insufficient training and sensitising. This could also provoke further ethnic tensions or alienation from the central government, which can be exploited by various extremist religious or separatist groups.

But the launch of the EUTM reveals two important aspects concerning the current state of the CSDP and EU member states interests. Firstly, the developments with regard to the establishment of EUTM and EU member states' willingness to solve the Malian crisis show the reluctance to use the institution of the stand-by EU battle groups, which are an essential part of CSDP structure for military crisis management.⁸¹ Reasons for this are the divergent security policy interests and strategic cultures of the member states⁸² as well as the associated unwillingness to get engaged in armed conflicts which do not touch their interests and which might last for years.⁸³ Also the burden of costs is a relevant reason for this political

⁸⁰ *Oksamytna*, p. 5. See also: Council of the European Union: Council conclusions on Mali, Press Release, 3217th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 17 January 2013, para. 7.

⁸¹ *Major/Mölling*, EU-Battlegroups. Bilanz und Optionen zur Weiterentwicklung europäischer Krisenreaktionskräfte, Studie der Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, August 2010, p. 7, available at http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_document.php?asset_id=7371 (26 May 2013).

⁸² *Giegerich*, European Military Crisis Management. Connecting ambition and reality, Oxon and New York 2008, p. 66. On the various strategic cultures of the most important EU member states of Germany, France and Great Britain see: Viehrig, Henrike: Militärische Auslandseinsätze. Die Entscheidungen europäischer Staaten zwischen 2000 und 2006, Wiesbaden 2010, pp. 166-174.

⁸³ *Feichtner*, Europäische Interessen – Motor und Hemmschuh zugleich, in: *Feichtner/Gebhard*, (eds.) Globale Sicherheit Europäische Potenzial Herausforderungen – Ansätze – Instrumente, Wien, Köln, Weimar 2010, pp. 85-103, here p. 95.

unwillingness.⁸⁴ Secondly, this crisis shows the growing tendency of EU member states to safeguard own foreign and security policy goals or interests individually or by a coalition of the willing.⁸⁵

The current crisis management of the EU with regard to Mali nourishes the scepticism that the EU member states are currently not willing to use the civilian and military structures, institutions and assets which the EU developed with the Treaty of Lisbon and which were designed for a comprehensive crisis management.

“The character of the EUTM operation falls perfectly within the shape of the latest operational engagement of the EU: the EUTM Somalia, EUCAP Nestor and EUAVSEC South Sudan are all highly specialised and relatively small operations, performing only secondary tasks in the context of the real security challenges of the regions they are deployed to.”⁸⁶

The EU stresses the need for Malian ownership and the special responsibility of ECOWAS and the AU with regard to the crisis management in Mali.⁸⁷ But the activation, formation, deployment and use of AFISMA clearly shows the various shortcomings of Western African countries to solve the Malian crisis. Especially during the initial phase of the French intervention the EU and its member states should have proven more solidarity and unity, because this lack of unity and solidarity weakens the EU's positions as global soft power and as strategic actor. And in addition, if the EU and its member states were de facto interested in local and regional ownership concerning the Malian crisis, a much more intense engagement would have been necessary in order to make Mali, ECOWAS and the AU capable of acting and that in a comprehensive manner, meaning in the LCO's security, good governance as well as reconstruction and development. But this has never been officially discussed by the EU and its member states. The EU limits its engagement mainly to financial assistance via the European Development Fund (EDF), the Instrument for Stability (IfS), various country programmes, European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument and thematic programmes and

⁸⁴ *Rekawek/ Terlikowski*, EU CSDP in the Light of the Crisis in Mali, PISM Bulletin No. 22 (475), 05th March 2013, p. 2, available at http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/161438/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/f6a23706-9ca9-4dcc-847e-7017d8846fc5/en/Bulletin+PISM+no+22+%28475%29%2C+5+March+2013.pdf (26 May 2013). See also: *Major/Mölling* (EU-Battlegroups), p. 29.

⁸⁵ *Rekawek/ Terlikowski*, p. 2.

⁸⁶ *Ibid*, p. 2.

⁸⁷ Council of the European Union: Council conclusions on Mali, Press Release, 3209th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 10 December 2012, para. 2. See also: Council of the European Union: Council conclusions on Mali, Press Release, 3217th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 17 January 2013. See also: EEAS (Strategy), p. 4.

budget lines.⁸⁸ But the practical support and supervision is limited to various EU delegations and cooperation platforms. But it is doubtful that this kind of development aid will bring sustainable improvement of the general situation in the Sahel region and Mali. The most important obstacle is the deeply rooted corruption in this region comprising the governments, its institutions and also to some extent the aid industries.⁸⁹ Without close supervision and guidance the financial aid vanishes without any positive effect on the ground.

Due to the complexity of the crisis in Mali and in the greater Sahel region the EU lacks the capacities and sustainability if dealing with the crisis on its own. And due to the fact that the UN was asked to transform the AFISMA into a UN peacekeeping operation, it is also not necessary that the EU will carry the burden of conducting a peacekeeping operation on its own.⁹⁰ But in order to share the responsibilities the EU and all other participating organizations and states have to define what their contribution will be and how they could coordinate these contributions in the best way for the benefit of the Malian people.

The UN Secretary-General acknowledged the gains of the French engagement with regard to the improvement of the general security situation in Mali since January 2013. But he also criticized the lack of political development.⁹¹

The numbers of the MDSF personnel become even more important if the IC wants to establish a sustainable safe and secure environment in Mali but also the Sahel region, because the regional interdependencies make an overall regional solution necessary. These current numbers of Malian armed and security forces might also lead to the assumption that recruiting of additional personnel might be unavoidable fact like the example of Afghanistan showed.⁹² The EUTM's current task is to train and educate four manoeuvre battalions of about 600 to

⁸⁸ EEAS (Strategy), p. 8f.

⁸⁹ Wiedemann, Die Krise in Mali. Demokratie für wen? Krieg gegen wen? Die Rolle der Zivilgesellschaft, die Verursacher der Krise und die Bedeutung religiöser Akteure, Berlin 17 December 2012, p. 4, available at http://www.boell.de/downloads/201212_Krise_in_Mali_Wiedemann.pdf (17 April 2013).

⁹⁰ United Nations Security Council: Letter dated 25 February 2013 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, (S/2013/113) 26th February 2013, p. 2, available at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2013_113.pdf (17 April 2013).

⁹¹ United Nations Security Council: Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali, (S/2013/189) 26th March 2013, p. 17, available at <http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/secgen-report-on-mali-26-march-1.pdf> (17 April 2013).

⁹² Beste, Trittin bei der Bundeswehr in Mali: Auf ein Bier an der Malaria-Bar, Spiegel online, 19th April 2013, available at <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/trittin-in-mali-besuch-der-bundeswehr-in-koulikoro-a-895470.html> (27 April 2013).

700 soldiers. The battalions will consist of newly recruited soldiers and already enlisted ones.⁹³

It seems also possible or maybe necessary that the mandate of the EUTM could be expanded and that the European trainer will accompany the Malian battalions after the training in Koulikoro⁹⁴ during their deployment to the northern region and during the combat missions against insurgent groups in these areas.⁹⁵ But this practise is currently explicitly excluded by the mission tasks of the EUTM⁹⁶ despite the fact that partnering or operational mentoring and liaison has become a successful counterinsurgency (COIN) practise in Afghanistan and Iraq. This measure had been applied due to the fact that Afghan and Iraqi troops did not prove to be sufficiently trained after a several weeks lasting basic training. The IC also realised that these troops did not manage to incorporate the values of and the need for human rights regime. This was only possible if the foreign trainers partner with their domestic counterparts for six months or even more and especially during COIN operations. Taking this aspect not into consideration might have led to further human rights abuses of the national armed forces and this might have resulted in further alienation of the local population from the national security forces and the state authority as well. This would make the local population furthermore prone to intimidation and propaganda of insurgent groups. An indicator for needed closer cooperation between MAF and the foreign peace troops is the past training of the MAF by U.S. forces of the African Command (AFCOM). This training lasted until the coup in 2012 and several battalions were trained in combat operations.

The EUTM focuses on the MAF, but does not consider the Malian Police and the Malian Gendarmerie and also lacks a comprehensive framework for a Security Sector Reform (SSR) which is necessary to strengthen the relevant Malian authorities and its mechanisms for civilian oversight and control over all of its security forces. Furthermore the SSR shall support the Malian Government in developing its capacities to restore the rule of law and strengthen the legal, judicial and corrections systems.⁹⁷ The Malian security forces play a special role for a sustainable conflict resolution. It will be objective of these forces to maintain a safe and

⁹³ *Fletcher*, French general urges EU to equip "impoverished" Mali army, Reuters, 20th February 2013, available at <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/20/us-mali-rebels-eu-idUSBRE91J1B320130220> (04 May 2013).

⁹⁴ Koulikoro is situated about 60 km north east of Bamako. At the Officers School of the MAF the EUTM established their camp for the training of the MAF.

⁹⁵ *Beste*.

⁹⁶ EU Council: Council Decision 2013/34/CFSP, Art. 1.

⁹⁷ UNSC (Report), p. 18.

secure environment of the whole Malian territory after the pacification by MAF, French forces and AFISMA / MINUSMA troops because armed forces are not trained to maintain permanently a safe and secure environment or represent the state monopoly on the use of force. And also from a democratic point of view this development would politically not be justifiable and suitable, because a permanent military presence within the Malian territory might support another coup d'état of the MAF or even the establishment of another military regime. From a European point of view, especially the fight against terrorism is a duty of security forces, including intelligence agencies.⁹⁸ Therefore well trained and equipped security forces which respect human rights and the primacy of politics are crucial for a long lasting conflict resolution in Mali and beyond.

This leads to another important aspect: the equipment with arms, vehicles, communications and other basic military equipment. The defection of Malian soldiers in the course of the Tuareg rebellion was not only due to bad training conditions or bad military and civilian leadership, but also due to a serious lack of sufficient equipment, which made it impossible to fight against the well-equipped and well trained Tuareg. A comprehensive SSR and general reform of the governmental authorities has to take this problem also into consideration. The Malian security authorities have to be empowered to take responsibility for equipping the MNSF and to maintain the standard of equipment, i.e. avoid theft or misappropriation. Otherwise a SSR would be ineffective.

The lack of political development and a comprehensive framework for a true and sustainable SSR goes along with the still crucial need for truth and reconciliation commission, including a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR)⁹⁹ program including all conflict parties which are willing to resolve the conflict. These measures are of crucial importance, because with ongoing military operations of French, Malian and AFISMA troops, the number of disengaged combatants rises. In order to avoid withdrawal and re-grouping of the disengaged

⁹⁸ Reuters (ed.): Mali breaks up suspected militant cell in Bamako: security sources, 29th April 2013, available at <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/29/us-mali-arrests-idUSBRE93S0PX20130429> (05 May 2013). See also: Council of the European Union: Sahel / Maghreb (crisis in Mali, IN AMENAS) - implications for EU internal security: executive summary, Brussels 4 March 2013, available at <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2013/mar/eu-council-sahel-internal-security-6983-13.pdf>. (05 May 2013). See also: *Gibert*, The EU in West Africa: from development to diplomatic policy? In: *Gross/Juncos*, (eds.): EU Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management, London and New York 2011, pp. 103 to 116, here p. 112.

⁹⁹ For a precise definition on DDR see: DDR 2008: *Caramés/Sanz*, Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes in the World during 2007', School for a Culture of Peace, Autonomous University of Barcelona 2009, p. 9.

combatants and a later re-engagement in the conflict, a sustainable solution is necessary. Additionally the conflict can only be solved, if armed irregular forces or militias gain the possibility to get reintegrated which includes a precise definition for amnesty regulations as long as the members of the irregular forces did not commit any violation of human rights or other severe criminal offences.¹⁰⁰ In the follow-up of past Tuareg rebellions some Tuareg were promised to be integrated into the MAF. But these agreements have not been fulfilled by the Malian government. An integration of Tuareg fighters into the MAF or in general the MNSF would be difficult but an ongoing neglecting or marginalization of the Tuareg would deepen the current grievances between the Tuareg and the Malian government. A proportional representation of all Malian ethnicities could be an important aspect of the solution.

The EU's strategy to resolve and transform the conflict is meant to be comprehensive. Various statements and documents of the EU and its member states call for comprehensive solutions and pretend that their actions are of comprehensive nature. But the current taken and planned measures, not least the French intervention as well as the EUTM Mali, respond almost exclusively to security-related issues of the Malian crisis and financial aid. But the current measures neglect aspects of general good governance as well as reconstruction and development.¹⁰¹ A focus on security related aspects is comprehensible, due to the fact that the most immanent aspect of the crisis was the armed struggle of the Tuareg for independence and the occupation of this rebellion by Islamist terror groups. These developments have to be countered immediately, but not solely these developments. And also the mainly monetary engagement of most European countries is comprehensible. Most European countries have no national foreign interest in Mali or the Sahel region. And also many countries are still engaged in Afghanistan which caused increasing resentments of the various citizens. Governments might try to avoid another foreign engagement of unknown outcome. This is especially true for the German government which plays a crucial role within the EU CFSP.¹⁰² But this attitude will not help solving the crisis.

¹⁰⁰ UNSC (Report), p. 18. See also: ECOWAS: La MISMA contrôle et sécurise plusieurs villes maliennes, Press release, 09 May 2013.

¹⁰¹ *Cristiani/Fabiani*, p. 13. See also: *Gibert*, p. 112.

¹⁰² *Friederichs*, *Westerwelles Untätigkeit ist sein Konzept*, *Die Zeit*, 15 January 2013, available at <http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2013-01/westerwelle-mali-unterstuetzung> (27 May 2013). See also: *BrösslerSolidarität ja, Waffengang nein*, *sueddeutsche.de*, 14 January 2013, available at <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/deutschland-und-der-krieg-in-mali-solidaritaet-ja-waffengang-nein-1.1573072> (27 May 2013).

Additionally a comprehensive change of Malian institutions and the political system would represent a severe intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state.¹⁰³ But an incomprehensive intervention only tackling the grievances the current Malian government wants to be solved is prejudiced and favours the current regime while discriminating the opposition and probably other social communities, like the Tuareg.

The lack of a common interest of the EU member states in Mali and the Sahel region together with a lack of a strong foreign and security policy institution result in inefficient and uncoordinated efforts of the EU and its member states. It seems as if the current contribution of the EUTM, some intelligence assets, strategic air lift and logistical support for AFISMA are the smallest common denominator on which the EU member states were able to agree on. France was in favour of an armed intervention and due to the fact that it did not find allies in this approach, it executed the intervention unilaterally. Germany on the other hand denied any contribution concerning combat operations.¹⁰⁴ With these both extremely different political positions of some of the most important EU players in CFSP a coherent agreement seems not achievable in the near future.¹⁰⁵ This becomes even more difficult if the fact will be taken into consideration that a comprehensive approach also takes the regional implications into consideration. But this would mean that the efforts of the IC, including the EU, would also address the economic, security-related, political, institutional, and social shortcomings in the countries of the Sahel region.¹⁰⁶

5. Definition of a comprehensive approach for Mali and beyond

Main tasks for an international peace building mission in Mali are regaining the legitimacy and establishing the authority of the Malian state and its government across the entire territory. This overarching aim can be achieved by a triad of three lines of operation (LOO): security, good governance, as well as reconstruction and development. The European External Action Service (EEAS) defined similar LOOs but as a diplomatic institution stressed the

¹⁰³ *Gibert*, p. 112.

¹⁰⁴ dapd (ed.): Westerwelle lehnt deutsche Beteiligung an Kampfeinsatz in Mali ab, 15th January 2013, available at <http://www.welt.de/newsticker/news3/article112766359/Westerwelle-lehnt-deutsche-Beteiligung-an-Kampfeinsatz-in-Mali-ab.html> (15 March 2013).

¹⁰⁵ *Gibert*, p. 107f.

¹⁰⁶ European Parliament Press Release: Romano Prodi: military intervention in Mali was "inevitable", 09th April 2013, available at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/content/20130405STO07013/html/Romano-Prodi-military-intervention-in-Mali-was-inevitable> (27 April 2013).

aspect of political and diplomatic action additionally by adding diplomatic actions as fourth LOO.¹⁰⁷

5.1. Security

The main burden of security related issues is taken by the UN through the establishment of MINUSMA. From 1st July 2013 AFISMA will be transferred to MINUSMA and then the UN is the leading organization. French forces will remain at least with about 1.000 soldiers in the country for a not defined period and are authorized “*to use all necessary means to intervene in support of elements of MINUSMA when under imminent and serious threat upon request of the Secretary-General*”¹⁰⁸ because this could endanger the essential primacy of neutrality of UN peace missions and its ‘blue helmets’. This could also mean that in the beginning France and maybe later an EU expeditionary force will conduct parallel operations to MINUSMA in order to conduct further combat and counter-terror operations.¹⁰⁹ The execution of major combat and counter-terrorism operations parallel to the UN mission is needed because the UN lacks the capacities and mandate to fulfil such task. Additionally it is doubtful that the UN have the “*ability to absorb the numbers of casualties that could be incurred through such operations.*”¹¹⁰ The UN Secretary-General also mentions the execution of such operations beyond the Malian borders not further explaining a possible legitimisation via the public international law or negotiations with neighbouring countries which would be crucial for such operations.¹¹¹

The withdrawal of the Chadian troops at the end of April 2013 was a sign of insufficient planning of the Chadian authorities as well as of the authorities of the AU and ECOWAS member states. It shows furthermore the serious lacks of sufficient funding for regional security issues within the African states.¹¹²

¹⁰⁷ Adding this new aspect to the general triad of LOOs is only reasonable for a diplomatic institution like the EEAS but it does not provide further insight for the general analysis of the Malian conflict, why this aspect will not be covered by this study. European External Action Service: Factsheet – The European Union and the Sahel, Brussels, 13 March 2013, p. 1.

¹⁰⁸ UNSC (S/RES/2100 (2013)), para. 18.

¹⁰⁹ UNSC (S/2013/189), para. 69, 70 and 78.

¹¹⁰ UNSC (S/2013/189), para. 70.

¹¹¹ UNSC (Report), p. 13 and 15.

¹¹² Hicks (Mali).

Also ECOWAS hesitation at the beginning of the French intervention in January 2013 shows the lack of strategic planning and logistical capacities and sustainability.

It is also questionable how far the troop contributing West African states of the AFISMA-mission, which will partially be transferred into the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission Mali (MINUSMA)¹¹³, will be capable of fulfilling the main tasks of the newly established 'blue helmet' mission.¹¹⁴ Especially in the beginning of the mission it is probable that international security forces will face asymmetric threats like IEDs and suicide attacks. The insurgents will hide within the local population and will strike targets of opportunity. In order to counter these threats special trained and equipped forces are necessary. A major focus at this phase will lie on intelligence lead operations of special forces. But for these tasks West African forces are not prepared and lack furthermore the sustainability in the course of multiple rotations. Also the UN is not able to grant these assets.¹¹⁵ Due to the current lack of interest of the U.S. in Mali, this would be a further task for European forces. But at the end of May 2013 France started a key stage of its military operation in Mali and started to withdraw a first contingent of its forces. Currently France has 3,800 troops left in Mali. France ministry of defence stated that the number will be down to 2,000 by September and 1,000 by the end of the year. Tanks and most heavy patrol vehicles will remain in northern Mali for now.¹¹⁶

Additionally the EU could assist in other fields of expertise for peacekeeping operations where the major African and Asian troop contributing nations lack the capacities. The fields of expertise are areas of interoperability, intelligence-driven operations, policing specialties,

¹¹³ ECOWAS: ECOWAS Defence Chiefs seek West African Command for UN Mission in Mali, Press Release N°: 131/2013, 14 May 2013, Abidjan - CoteD'Ivoire, available at <http://news.ecowas.int/presseshow.php?nb=131&lang=en&annee=2013> (25 May 2013). On general shortcoming of AFISMA troops see: UNSC (S/2013/189), para. 46.

¹¹⁴ UNSC S/Res/2100(2013), p. 3. For the tasks of MINUSMA see para. 16 UNSC S/Res/2100(2013). These are: (a) *Stabilization of key population centres and support for the reestablishment of State authority throughout the country*; (b) *Support for the implementation of the transitional road map, including the national political dialogue and the electoral process*; (c) *Protection of civilians and United Nations personnel*, (d) *Promotion and protection of human rights*; (e) *Support for humanitarian assistance*; (f) *Support for cultural preservation*; and (g) *Support for national and international justice*.

¹¹⁵ UNSC (S/2013/189), para. 69f.

¹¹⁶ BBC (ed.): France army in key Mali withdrawal, 25th May 2013, available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-22664484> (26 May 2013).

and air assets.¹¹⁷ Other countries than France already contributed assets, especially air lift capacities and intelligence assets.

Besides enabling the MAF to take over the ownership for establishing safe and secure environment within the Malian territory, in a long-run perspective the EU could also enable other West African armed and security forces to counter regional terrorism and transnational organized crime. This would be crucial because these conflict mechanisms do not solely threaten the Malian state as well as its government and authorities but also most of the other states of Western Africa and the Maghreb. But it would be difficult for the EU and its member states to identify loyal partners which bear the potential risk to switch into authoritarian regimes and use the newly acquired abilities of their security forces for suppression of political opposition or minorities. This also indicates that each single support of security forces in Mali and beyond should be backed by specific SSRs and general reforms in the field of good governance, like democratic and civilian control over armed and security forces, establishment of human rights standards and domestic supervision bodies.

The recent history of the EU and its member states is full of such difficult and dangerous alliances. The case of Libya and its authoritarian regime of Qaddafi shows that former support could turn against the EU and its member states. In the end the EU had to found itself engaged in an armed conflict to overthrow Qaddafi and his regime and to pacify the country. The phase after the decolonization is full of examples where western interventionists picked allies which turned sooner or later against them.

The example of the Somalian conflict and the locally deployed African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) show another field of European engagement which seems to be a further field of EU engagement in Mali. The funding of AMISOM and by this the existence of the mission depends heavily on EU funding. The EU and its member states pay for peacekeepers' salaries, medical costs, housing, fuel, and communication equipment.¹¹⁸ The withdrawal of Chadian troops in April 2013 clearly illustrates the domestic budgetary deficits of ECOWAS and AU member states and the resulting domestic political restraints to spend scarce taxpayers' money on foreign and security affairs. Therefore EU and member states spending

¹¹⁷ International Peace Institute (ed.): Enhancing European Military and Police Contributions to UN Peacekeeping, February 2013, p. 6, available at <http://www.pearsoncentre.org/dl243> (19 March 2013).

¹¹⁸ *Oksamytna*, p. 4. See also: European Commission: Towards a better future for Somalia: EU gives new support to the African Union Mission (Press Release), Brussels, 25 September 2012, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-998_en.pdf (10 May 2013).

on AFISMA / MINUSMA could support AU / ECOWAS member states' willingness to participate in the peacekeeping mission in Mali.

5.2. Good Governance

Another fundamental aspect of the comprehensive crisis resolution in Mali is the execution of free, fair and transparent elections. Currently the Malian government but also the majority of the IC, especially France, favour elections in July 2013. The Malian government suggested the 7th July 2013, but a final decision on this is still pending. The elections should be executed parallel with the process of dialogue and reconciliation. But a crucial prerequisite is a minimum level of mutual respect and tolerance as well as reliable level of reconciliation between all ethnicities and social groups involved in the crisis. This is of such fundamental importance because elections without basic social conflict settlement might easily lead to radicalisation of the public opinions during the electoral campaigning which could endanger all previous gains.¹¹⁹ And this might also lead to a deepening of the widespread lack of trust in domestic politicians and policy in general. Furthermore, a too early held election only benefits the old elites¹²⁰ because the necessary new formation and establishment of social interest group and parties has yet not begun. But a fundamental aim of fair, democratic and equal elections is that all ethnicities and social milieus should gain the possibility for representation. But at the current stage of the unsolved inter-ethnic conflicts and still of open or smouldering crises the execution of fair, democratic and equal elections and its legitimatising effect for the current and probably future government are doubtful. One reason why the IC is that strongly insisting on those early elections is the political and maybe legal need for a legitimate government in order to conduct further negotiations on the future comprehensive political development of Mali, including security issues, good governance as well as reconstruction and development.¹²¹ From the perspective of the IC these needs are comprehensible but seem to be countering the domestic developments of dialogue and reconciliation and are threatening to undermine the legitimacy of democratic development.

Beside these social preconditions for the elections, there are also some 'technical' conditions to successful and legitimate elections. These comprise a safe and secure environment in the

¹¹⁹ International Crisis Group (Mali), p. 1f.

¹²⁰ Xinhua (ed.): Mali: le front anti-putsch entend créer une plate-forme politique et électorale, 26th May 2013, available at http://french.news.cn/2013-05/26/c_132408841.htm (26th May 2013).

¹²¹ *Wiedemann* (Kriegsziel), p. 11.

overall Malian territory and for all ethnicities prior to, during and after the electoral period, including the campaigning period. Furthermore equitable access to state-controlled, independent media as well as provision for all eligible persons also including internally displaced people (IDPs) and refugees to take part in the electoral process. Additionally foreign countries as well as regional and international organisations are requested to support the elections in general and also by providing financial resources, electoral observation capacities and technical assistance.¹²² The EU examines the possibility of establishing an electoral observation mission for the presidential elections.¹²³

But before elections can be held, at least basic conditions for DDR and dialogue and reconciliation programme have to be met. Otherwise various conflict parties, ethnic groups and local communities might not be willing to participate in the electoral process and by this undermining the legitimacy of the elections in general and by this also the future government.

5.3. Reconstruction and Development

Due to the fact that reconstruction and development is contrary to security and good governance no state monopoly, the engagement of the EU should keep a lower profile in this LOO. This aspect of conflict resolution should be left mainly for non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and domestic or local state authorities and private actors.

But the EU and other governmental actors like UN, AU or ECOWAS should focus on control and evaluation of the spending of development aid. This could also be inter-linked with aspect of good governance with regard to counter corruption and foster transparency.

Due to the fact that the EU seems not to be willing and politically able to support the progress in Mali beside financial aid and training of the MAF, the EU should at least support the economic relief of Mali and uses its political and economic power to establish a regime of conditionality. This regime of political conditionality could be used in order to foster a

¹²² United Nations Security Council Resolution 2100 (2013), Adopted by the Security Council at its 6952nd meeting, on 25 April 2013 (S/Res/2100(2013)), p. 4, available at <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2013/sc10987.doc.htm> (03 May 2013).

¹²³ *Füle*, Debate of the European Parliament on 13 March 2013 in Strasbourg, available at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20130313+ITEM-015+DOC+XML+V0//EN> (03 May 2013).

political environment which allows and supports an eligible dialogue and reconciliation process.¹²⁴

According to an Oxfam's report on a potential development aid concept for Mali, donors should commit to providing aid at least for the duration of 15 years, which is the amount of time needed to successfully undertake necessary government reforms and tackle the root causes of poverty. This time frame stands in complete contrast with the two years mentioned in the Malian government's reconstruction plan.¹²⁵

One possibility to strengthen the Malian economy is the diversification of the Malian economy. Currently Mali's main exporting goods are cotton and gold. These goods heavily depend on world market prices and thus also the Malian economy depends on the world market prices. In order to reduce these interdependences and to escape the risks and disadvantages of a monotonous economy, a diversification programme for the Malian economy should be initialized. Mali has other resources like uranium, bauxite, phosphate, copper, marble, oil and natural gas. These resources could be an important element for diversification. The resources can be one aspect for further diversification. But in order to achieve this reliable domestic and external partners are necessary.¹²⁶

Furthermore Mali has rich water resource which can be used for the agricultural industry but also for the energy sector. A further professionalization of the agriculture could increase the yield and make the economy more competitive.

The energy can also be used to further process the extracted resources because processed resources will achieve higher profits on the world market. Additionally, the processing of resource will generate employment. But in order to be able to establish a more sophisticated industry, investments in infrastructure, education, legal certainty, and political stability are

¹²⁴ Council of the European Union: A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy, Brussels 12 December 2003, p. 11, available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/european-security-strategy?lang=de> (06 May 2013). See also: *Cristiani/Fabiani*, p. 16.

¹²⁵ *Labusquière*, Mali: A New Development Contract. What kind of aid is needed to end the crisis, OXFAM Briefing Note, 15th May 2013, p. 2, available at <http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bn-mali-new-development-contract-150513-en.pdf> (24 May 2013). See also: *Bauwens*, With Billions of Euros Pledged, Mali Risks Aid Overflow, Inter Press Service, 16th May 2013, available at <http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/05/with-billions-of-euros-pledged-mali-risks-aid-overflow/> (24 May 2013).

¹²⁶ *Kolb* (Strategie), p. 3.

necessary. Also a functioning tax system is crucial in order to keep a share of the profits in Mali. But also in this regard good governance and transparency are essential prerequisite.¹²⁷

The EU could be an important partner for Mali in all these aspects of economic development and the EU could also help the Malian government to get better access to the world market and especially to the European market by abolishing or at least reducing trade barriers like customs and tariffs. But developing the economy of a country in a sustainable manner would afford foreign engagements for years or even decades. Not only financial engagement but also a comprehensive political support is needed which addresses Malian conditions and needs. But it is not only a question of European effort but also of the effort waged by the Malian authorities.

Besides adding new agendas to the already existing ones, the EU should consider to better coordinate its various aid programmes for Mali and the Sahel region. And the EU should also try to coordinate the various national programmes of its member states in that region in order to achieve a more effective and sustainable outcome of the used resources.¹²⁸

Beside the three traditional lines of operation, a fourth could be adopted: the population. In all conflicts the population plays a crucial if not the fundamental role in conflict resolution. The LOO of security, good governance as well as reconstruction and development do not fulfil an “end in itself”. They represent areas of activity where improvements are needed to influence the conflict for the better. The aims are peaceful, secure and prosper living conditions for the local population.¹²⁹ Therefore the LOO ‘population’ is on the one hand the aim of conflict resolution but on the other hand fundamental part of the process of conflict resolution.

An aspect of modern conflict resolution consists of DDR or dialogue and reconciliation programmes. These concepts contribute to a sustainable conflict settlement through demobilization of all conflicts parties except the legitimate security forces of the state representing the state’s monopoly on the use of force. Theoretically this contributes significantly to the improvement of the security situation and allows state actors and NGOs to address the needs of the local population. Furthermore after disarmament of the militias and conflict parties, governmental authorities can resume their offices in the abandoned provinces of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu which is essential for granting good governance.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.* See also: *Kirstensen/Ba*, p. 8.

¹²⁸ *Lacher/Tull*, p. 7.

¹²⁹ Headquarters Department of the Army (ed.) *Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency*, December 2006, para. 1-4., available at <http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf> (09 June 2013).

‘Parasovereignty’¹³⁰ or decentralization¹³¹ are some concepts to grant the Tuareg but also other ethnicities more local ownership. And this is also still a core demand of some Tuareg groups. But was not the widely granted autonomy to local communities by the Malian government one reason for the decrease of the political and security situation. Furthermore a secession or officially granted partial autonomy could evoke further claims of other ethnic groups in Mali but also in the whole Sahel region, triggering further geopolitical dynamics of fragmentation which would further decrease the situation in Mali and beyond which would also not be in favour of the French government and the governments of the other EU member states.¹³² Furthermore, until May 2013 it seems as if only Tuareg and Islamist groups are favouring independence of Northern Mali. The other ethnicities inhabiting the three northern Malian provinces seem not to claim sovereignty or partial sovereignty. And also at least some of the former secessionist Tuareg groups seem to change their strategic goals and skipped independence in favour of increased regional autonomy but in line with a general dialogue with the Malian government.¹³³

6. Afrighanistan – are lessons learned made in Afghanistan transferable to the Malian crisis?

In the course of the French intervention some author raised their doubts about the feasibility of the pacification of Mali and reminded the reader of the sagging deterioration of the (security) situation in Afghanistan. And these authors also tried to predict the outcome of the French intervention in Mali before it had really started¹³⁴:

“It is more convinced than ever that even the best-intentioned foreign intervention is bound to bog its armies down in endless wars fighting invisible enemies to help ungrateful locals.”¹³⁵

¹³⁰ Trotha/Klute, Von der Postkolonie zur Parastaatlichkeit – das Beispiel Schwarzafrika. In: Reiter (eds.), Jahrbuch für internationale Sicherheitspolitik, Dezember 2001, available at <http://www.heer.at/wissenschaft/publicationen/beitrag.php?id=611> (05 May 2013).

¹³¹ Wiedemann, pp. 9f. See also: Kolb (Strategie), p. 2.

¹³² Cristiani/Fabiani, p. 16.

¹³³ Associated Press (AP): Tuareg leaders announce new group in northern Mali, 06 May 2013, available at http://www.mercurynews.com/ci_23180211/tuareg-leaders-announce-new-group-northern-mali (10 May 2013).

¹³⁴ Some statements are cited at Francis, p. 13f.

¹³⁵ The Economist (ed.): Afrighanistan? The real danger is that the world turns its back on another poor place threatened by jihadists, Jan 26th 2013, from the print edition, available at <http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21570704-real-danger-world-turns-its-back-another-poor-place-threatened> (05 February 2013).

But a comparison of these two conflicts is very difficult and also the transfer of lessons learned is therefore very difficult and most often not very helpful.

Of course there is evident, superficial correspondence between these conflicts. Both conflicts are driven by Islamist in an Islamic, underdeveloped and land-locked country with corrupt government officials and an obvious democratic deficit. But after a more precise view on the conflict parameters, it becomes obvious that these conflicts are far away from comparable.

The Tuareg insurgency was secular, even though it was later on hijacked by various Islamist terror groups. But the majority of the Malian people opposed the establishment of Sharia due to the fact that the Malian people have a diverse and liberal religious culture. The Taliban regime in Afghanistan was purely and from the beginning an Islamist movement with the aim to conquer the whole country and establish the Sharia in a Caliphate. The Tuareg insurgency was of secessionist nature. The Afghan insurgency of the Taliban was lead and supported mainly by the Pashtun ethnicity which represent in most parts of the country the demographic majority, especially in the eastern and southern parts where the movement had its beginning and still today its strongholds, like Helmand and Kandahar. And for quite a while the Taliban enjoyed a broad support within civil society because the Taliban establish a strict regime and re-established law and order in a country which suffered for three decades from various civil wars, local power brokers and the Soviet occupation from 1979 to 1989. And in some areas of Afghanistan the Taliban gain still today vital support of the local population, either by coercion or voluntarily. But the Tuareg represent a minority in the whole country and also in the northern three provinces. And despite some Tuareg rebellions the Malian people experienced a peaceful time during the last decade. And even though the Malian government and its administration are corrupt and not very efficient to a large extent, but at least a (limited) functioning administration and government exists. This was not true for Afghanistan for most parts of the country and is only partially true nowadays. And also concerning the neighbouring countries crucial differences exists. While the Afghan neighbours Pakistan and Iran are not interested in an effective and sustainable conflict settlement because these countries want to detract from their own domestic problems and want to bind U.S. forces in Afghanistan in order to avoid a U.S. focus on their countries. But the Malian neighbours are very much interested in a stable Mali, because the governments of Chad, Niger, Nigeria, and Algeria fear a spillover from Mali to their own respective countries and a consequential destabilisation of their political systems. And while the insurgency in Afghanistan is directly

supported by the governments of Pakistan through the military intelligence service ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) and Iran through the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, there is currently no evidence that the Tuareg or Islamist insurgency is supported by any neighbouring government or its security forces.

And also the scale of military intervention and the political impact of the Malian crisis differ dramatically. While the French intervention was conducted on request of the Malian government with permission of the UN, the U.S. led intervention in Afghanistan was the result of a terrorist attack on the USA executed by Al Qaida which established its safe haven in the Taliban reigned Afghanistan.

Some authors mourn about the time spent on conflicts like Afghanistan or Iraq. But are ten or even more years really a long period for re-building a state, its government and administration as well as educating the majority of the population? Because nothing less was tried in both countries. Establishing democracy and equality of women in a country like Afghanistan is a tremendous mission. And the same is true for a dialogue and reconciliation programme. This will also take years. And over the time western troop contributing nations will suffer losses of soldiers and aid workers. And this strains the political endurance and willingness of these countries, becoming the most important obstacle to a long lasting and sustainable conflict settlement, peace building, as well as nation building.¹³⁶

These arguments show, that for each conflict a complete new assessment of the situation is necessary and a serious evaluation if lessons learned of former conflicts are admissible.¹³⁷ But the arguments put forward do not mean that the Malian crisis might escalate and transfer to and large scale Islamist-led insurgency which might destabilize the whole region. There is currently no evidence which indicates such a development.

General doubts about the efficiency and legitimacy of armed interventions are legitimate as well as scientific and political discussions on efficiency and legitimacy of armed interventions are necessary. But what were French's alternatives at the beginning of January 2013? Should

¹³⁶ The quite hasty withdrawal of Canadian and Dutch troops after national elections is an example of the symptoms of political fatigue. BBC News online: Dutch troops end Afghanistan deployment, 01 August 2010, available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-10829837> (09 June 2013). See also: Headquarters Department of the Army (Counterinsurgency), para. 1-134 to 1-136.

¹³⁷ Helly, EU engagement in the Sahel: lessons from Somalia and AfPak, European Union Institut for Security Studies Policy Brief 09, December 2012, p. 3, available at http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/PB__9.pdf (06 February 2013).

France have waited until the Islamist groups reached Bamako or until ECOWAS troops were combat ready during the second half of 2013, like it was envisaged in the end of 2012?¹³⁸

7. Conclusions

The objectives of the EU to restore Malian territorial integrity and to reduce the threat posed by terrorist groups just by establishing a military training mission and to increase their spending on development aid like the ‘Donor Conference for Development in Mali’ on 15th May 2013 was unrealistic. The EU’s effort remains also unrealistic taking the efforts of the ECOWAS, AU and UN into consideration. The majority of the measures taken by the EU and its member states seem just to aim at restoring a safe and secure environment and to reduce potential risks to continental Europe. But just focusing on security issues is neglecting the need for fundamental changes in the region in order to tackle the root causes of the various crises in Mali and the Sahel region. The fact that the UN took the general responsibility as umbrella organization and leaves spaces of manoeuvre for other regional organizations like the EU, AU, and ECOWAS makes it easy for the EU to avoid any unintended involvement and leaves the stake of responsibilities to ECOWAS and the AU. One can argue that this would be in line with the general concept of local ownership, but in this situation the majority of the governments proved to be unwilling and unable to take the appropriate measures, not at least because the governments represent a fundamental aspect of the crises. But nevertheless if France as one of the most vivid external actors of the EU starts an armed intervention in the closer vicinity of the EU, and the EU supports the intervention with a military operation, further measures would be necessary. Especially because the EU already realized the need for comprehensive crisis management which became with the Lisbon Treaty a fundamental aspect of the EU’s external affairs tool set. And therefore it is quite surprising that the EU launches a military operation with a heavily restricted mandate which only concentrates on military training of the MAF, neglecting the need for wider reforms comprising all security forces and relevant state institutions involved – meaning a comprehensive SSR. Additionally the EU did yet not consider the need for further development aid with regard to basic services and economic reforms. The EU is seen as a neutral conflict party of good reputation within

¹³⁸ “*Emphasizes that the military planning will need to be further refined before the commencement of the offensive operation*” United Nations Security Council Resolution 2085(2012), 20 December 2012, para. 11, available at <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N12/660/67/PDF/N1266067.pdf?OpenElement> (05 June 2013). Taz.de (ed.): Afisma heißt die Rettung. 22.12.2012, available at <http://www.taz.de/!107942/> (05 June 2013).


most domestic conflict parties. This fact implies that the EU should take the responsibility and introduce itself as mediator for all willing conflict parties. This could be of high relevance because the EU is perceived as supranational organisation without significant own interests in Mali and the Sahel region.

Finally it can be assessed that despite repeated announcements to the contrary of the EU, the current effort of the EU and its member states do not represent a coordinated and comprehensive approach in order to transform the crisis and establish sustainable peace and long lasting development of the country or the region.

Finally the circumstance that the EU is a union of independent, sovereign states with own foreign and security policy interests which makes the establishment of a peace force and defining common goals which are binding for all much more complicate. Though the decision to intervene in and support of Mali is an important achievement for the EU. But for unknown reasons the comprehensive approach of the EU has some serious shortcomings. Especially the fact that the translation of EU's policy claims into practice heavily depends on EU member states' political will. These shortcomings endanger on the one hand the success of the mission and on the other hand undermine the view of the EU as global (soft) power. Especially because the shortcomings of the EU are part of EU's soft skills which make it a soft power.


Another reason for hesitation of the majority of EU's member states are the developments of the Arab spring and all its predictable and unpredictable side effects - like the Malian crisis. An intervention in Mali would make further interventions or at least further civilian engagement in the neighbouring countries necessary. But these engagements would bind political and financial resources of the crisis management which are generally difficult to engage in Common Foreign and Security Policy goals, especially in times of long lasting budgetary crisis and cutting of public budget, EU member states face further severe problems in these policy fields.

Appendix:



Source: United Nations, Cartographic Section, Department of Field Support. <http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/english/htmain.htm> (accessed on 26th May 2013).

Source: United Nations, Cartographic Section, Department of Field



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